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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON  
INFLATION AND MONETARY POLICY  
IN TURKEY 
 
Us, Vuslat 
Ph. D., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kıvılcım Metin Özcan 
 
October 2003 
 
This dissertation analyzes three studies on inflation dynamics and monetary policy 
alternatives in Turkey. In the first article, inflation inertia is analyzed. To this aim, 
expectations are assumed to be formed optimal univariate in a staggared contracts 
model setting,. An alternative assumption, which then would be subject to Lucas 
critique, is that expectations are naive. Consequently, the analysis favors the first 
alternative to the latter one in explaining high and persistent inflation.   
In the second study, the degree of currency substitution is analyzed by using 
various definitions. More specifically, ratchet effect in currency substitution is 
studied by Autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) procedure. The statistical evidence 
suggests that even though currency substitution has been persistent at an increasing 
degree, the economy at large has not been irreversibly dollarized yet. 
The final study of this dissertation discusses monetary transmission mechanism 
in a small structural model setting. In this framework, using various simulations the 
implementation of a standard Taylor Rule is analyzed. The alternative proposal is the 
use a monetary conditions index as a policy rule. The results show that the second 
alternative is preferable since the economy is then exposed to lessened volatility. 
 
Keywords: Turkish economy, Persistent inflation, Optimal univariate expectations, 
Lucas critique, Currency substitution, Autoregressive distributed lag, Ratchet effect, 
dollarization, Monetary transmission mechanism, Taylor rule, Monetary conditions 
index 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKYE’DE ENFLASYON VE PARA POLTKASI  
ÜZERNE ÜÇ MAKALE 
 
Us, Vuslat 
Doktora, ktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Kıvılcım Metin Özcan 
 
Ekim 2003 
 
Bu tezde Türk ekonomisindeki enflasyon süreci ve para politikasına ilikin üç 
çalıma yer almaktadır. kinci bölümde yer alan ilk çalımanın konusu Türkiye’de 
enflasyon ataleti üzerinedir. Bu dorultuda oluturulan istikrarlı fiyat modelinde 
bekleyiler optimal tek deikenli oluturulmu; bekleyilere ilikin sözkonusu 
varsayıma alternatif olarak getirilen intibak edici bekleyilerin ise Lucas eletirisine 
maruz kalacaı gösterilmitir. Bu çerçevede, optimal tek deikenli bekleyiler 
yoluyla modelleme yüksek ve kalıcı enflasyonu açıklamada tercih edilebilir.  
kinci çalımada deiik tanımlar kullanılarak Türkiye’de para ikamesi ve para 
ikamesinin derecesi incelenmi; otoregresif daıtılmı gecikme prosedürü yoluyla 
para ikamesindeki ratchet etkisi incelenmitir. statiksel bulgular, para ikamesinin 
artan oranda devamlı hale gelmekle beraber geni anlamdaki para ikamesi tanımına 
gore, Türk ekonomisinde henüz geri döndürülemez bir boyutta dolarizasyon 
olmadıını göstermektedir.  
Son bölümde kullanılan küçük yapısal makroekonomik model yoluyla parasal 
aktarım mekanizması tartıılmı; bu çerçevede politika aracı olarak standart Taylor 
Kuralı izlenmesi ve alternatif olarak ise parasal artlar endeksi oluturulması 
tartıılmıtır. Simülasyon sonuçları ve literatürdeki kanıtlar, ikinci alternatif olan 
parasal artlar endeksi oluturulmasının Türk ekonomisi için tercih edilmesi 
gerektiini göstermektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk ekonomisi, Enflasyon atalaeti, Optimal tek deikenli 
bekleyiler, Lucas eletirisi, Para ikamesi, Otoregresif daıtılmı gecikme prosedürü, 
Ratchet etkisi, Dolarizasyon, Parasal aktarım mekanizması, Taylor kuralı, Parasal 
artlar endeksi 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation is an array of studies on various macroeconomic issues in Turkey.  
During the last 30 years, Turkish economy has experienced relatively high levels of 
inflation. Large budget deficits in addition to high and rising real interest rates fed 
into high inflation and in turn are fed by high inflation and the associated risks. Yet, 
chronic and high inflation has not degenerated into hyperinflation as it did in most 
other countries. However, the average of about 20 percent inflation rate in the 1970s, 
and 60 percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and finally, 80 percent in the late 
1990s clearly show the persistence and the upward trend in inflation. Many attempts 
were made for disinflation using monetary anchors and monetary tightening, but to 
little avail. On the other hand, lack of discipline in the fiscal front only worsened the 
situation by eroding the credibility of such attempts. However, it is very hard to 
break this inflationary inertia without establishing the credibility required for the 
successful implementation of a disinflation program. Building credibility on the other 
hand, requires change in expectations. Therefore, a disinflation attempt should start 
with modeling expectation formation in Turkey. 
A standard tool in explaining inflationary inertia is through sticky price 
models. However, sticky price models with rational expectations perform poorly in 
explaining the inflationary inertia. This poor performance on the other hand 
constitutes the basis for sticky price models of near rational expectations in the recent 
literature. However, previous studies on inflationary inertia in Turkey not only lack a 
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model of nominal stickiness but also do not try to explain inflation persistence by 
expectations. Even though, there is evidence for persistent inflation in Turkey as 
confirmed by earlier studies, and other studies provide evidence that expectations are 
neither perfectly rational nor purely adaptive, there is no attempt to link this near 
rational behavior to inflationary inertia. Given this gap, Chapter II is devoted to 
testing empirically a sticky price model under the assumption of near rational 
expectations on two different inflation episodes in the Turkish economy. The near 
rational expectations as described by optimal univariate expectations where agents 
use information on past inflation optimally while data on other variables are ignored, 
not only fit the data for both periods but also are not subject to Lucas (1976) critique. 
Alternatively, near rational expectations are assumed to be naive. This alternative 
scenario shows that optimal univariate expectations perform even better during 
relatively higher inflation periods. 
Chapter III is an initial attempt to model whether currency substitution in 
Turkey has reached an irreversible stage or not. The previous studies on currency 
substitution in the Turkish economy provide evidence on the existence of currency 
substitution in Turkey. Yet, these works do not provide information on whether 
currency substitution in Turkey has reached an irreversible stage or not. Chapter III 
on the other hand, analyzes the persistence of the currency substitution in Turkey by 
including a ratchet variable in model specification. In models that include a ratchet 
variable, the common practice is to include the past peak value of one of the key 
explanatory variables or the dependent variable. If the ratchet effect is significant, 
then one can conclude that the currency substitution is persistent enough to be 
irreversible. This study, given the high and persistent inflation rate in Turkey over 
the last two decades, by using the past peak value of the inflation rate as a ratchet 
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variable, analyzes whether there is hysteresis in currency substitution. In doing so, 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) modeling approach is used. Alternatively, the 
past peak value of the depreciation of the Turkish lira is also used as a ratchet 
variable. The results suggest that even though the persistence in the currency 
substitution may have been depreciation and inflation rate driven initially, both of 
these variables had a less significant impact on the persistence of currency 
substitution in the following periods. Then, one can conclude that the persistence of 
the currency substitution cannot totally be attributed to high levels of inflation or 
depreciation of the domestic currency.  
We repeated the same exercise using the past peak value of the currency 
substitution as a ratchet variable. The past peak value of the currency substitution 
when used as the ratchet variable not only reflects the contribution of the 
depreciation rate or the inflation rate to the persistence of the currency substitution, 
but also, all other factors that influenced the currency substitution process in the past. 
The results suggest that regardless of the degree, currency substitution in the first 
period is not persistent enough to be irreversible. For the second period, even though 
currency substitution in the narrow sense is persistent, currency substitution in the 
broader sense has not become irreversible. Therefore, monetary authorities can still 
conduct effective policies since the economy at large has not been dollarized yet.  
Chapter IV studies monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey using a small 
structural macroeconomic model. The core equations of the model consist of 
aggregate demand, wage-price setting, uncovered interest rate parity, foreign sector 
and a monetary policy rule.  Disinflation path, output gap, output level, exchange 
rate, interest rate, and also the output-inflation variance frontier of the economy are 
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analyzed under various scenarios. The first scenario assumes that a standard Taylor 
rule is implemented as the policy rule. In the alternative scenario, instead of the 
standard Taylor rule, the MCI, Monetary Conditions Index- combination of the 
changes in the short-term real interest rate and in the real effective exchange rate in a 
single variable- is used as a policy instrument. The results indicate that the economy 
stabilizes much more quickly and shows significantly less volatility under this new 
setting. Therefore, we conclude that the policymakers should consider using MCI as 
an instrument when conducting monetary policy. 
After discussing these various issues, finally the last chapter concludes this 
study. The output of the analysis in Chapter II is provided in Appendix A. 
Consequently, the output of the analyses in Chapters III-IV can be found in 
Appendices B-C, respectively. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
INFLATION EXPECTATIONS UNDER HIGH AND 
PERSISTENT INFLATION: OPTIMAL UNIVARIATE 
EXPECTATIONS AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Classical models of economics attribute no connection between real variables 
(such as employment or output) and nominal variables (such as money and prices). 
Consequently, changes in monetary variables have no influence on real variables. On 
the other hand, Keynesian and New Keynesian economists see a strong connection 
between real and monetary variables. For instance, in his famous paper of 1958, 
Phillips suggested essentially that the nominal wage rate in any period could be 
explained by recent values of the unemployment rate. In support of this hypothesis 
that the rate of change of wage rate depends negatively on the unemployment rate, 
Phillips presented evidence relating to the UK economy over the period 1861-1957.  
The “original Phillips curve”, that described this negative relationship 
between unemployment rate and the change in wage rate, when added to a 
Keynesian model, provided a system that could be used to depict the dynamic 
movements of the economy’s main macroeconomic variables assuming that the time 
paths or generating processes are specified for the exogenous policy variables. 
Economists, in effect, adopted this approach in the late 1950s and throughout the 
1960s. 
 6
In a steady state equilibrium, without a technical progress, money wage rate 
grows at the same rate does the money stock and the price level. Therefore, the 
tradeoff between the percentage change in nominal wages and the unemployment 
rate as explained by the original Phillips curve also implies a tradeoff between the 
unemployment rate and the inflation rate, which further implies that an economy 
cannot permanently reduce its inflation rate without creating additional 
unemployment. 
As early as 1966-67, however, Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) argued 
that the original Phillips curve formulation contains a serious flaw. According to 
Friedman-Phelps argument, it is the real wage that should rise when there is excess 
demand for labor, so when deriving the Phillips curve, nominal wages should be 
deflated by the price level in order to obtain the real wage in relation to 
unemployment rate. When nominal wages are settled between firms and workers on 
the basis of conditions prevailing in the recent past, the actual value of the price level 
cannot be known, but can only be anticipated. Therefore, the price level used in the 
denominator should be the expected price level as opposed to current price level. 
Hence, this revised formulation of the Phillips curve is often referred to as 
“expectations-augmented Phillips curve” as it includes the expected price level. The 
tradeoff implied by the original Phillips curve does not exist in this expectations-
augmented Phillips curve. Furthermore, the Friedman-Phelps Phillips curve implies 
that the steady state unemployment rate is not related to the steady state inflation 
rate. 
An important alternative approach to the inflation-unemployment relation 
was developed by Lucas (1972, 1973, 1992). Lucas worked out a theory of Phillips 
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curve type correlations that result not from slow wage or price adjustments, but from 
individuals’ misperceptions about current macroeconomic conditions since 
individuals have incomplete information concerning the state of the economy. The 
basic driving variable behind this misperception is the average discrepancy between 
each local seller’s price and the local seller’s perception of the aggregate price level. 
The model implies that if individuals know current values of the aggregate money 
stock, there will be no Phillips curve type relationship, even temporarily. However, 
Lucas’s theory that absence of price level or money stock data, -monetary 
misperceptions-, could be an important source of output fluctuations seems 
implausible. 
Taylor (1979, 1980) has developed another influential model of inflation-
unemployment relation. According to the model, the price charged by a seller 
relative to the prices of other sellers are set and held fixed for a number of periods. 
Because of the stickiness in prices, the model implies a permanent tradeoff between 
unemployment and monetary variables. 
Another theory that is often linked with Taylor (1979, 1980) is by Fischer 
(1977), where, prices are predetermined but not fixed. Half of the wages are set at 
the start of t to prevail in periods t and t+1, where, the values for the two periods are 
not the same, and the value set for each period equals the expected market-clearing 
level. On the other hand, the other half will have had their period t wage set in the 
beginning of period t-1. Firms choose employment level such that the marginal 
product of labor equals the real wage. Marginal product of labor decreases as 
employment increases which further implies that output of each firm is negatively 
related to real wage and hence to the price level. This relationship can be generalized 
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across firms. Therefore, an aggregate supply curve, which can be used instead of a 
Phillips curve, can be derived.  
After this little introduction, then the question comes as what the objective of 
this study is. This study concentrates purely on the question on how the relationship 
between inflation and output in Turkey can be best modeled. More specifically, the 
analysis is mainly based on answering the question of how the inflation persistence 
in Turkey can be explained using the relationship between inflation and output, with 
special emphasis on how the expectations are formed. In doing so, a model of price 
adjustment under the assumption of near rationality is tested in the Turkish economy 
context. Within this framework, first, it will be shown that the assumption of 
perfectly rational expectations contradicts with the initial assumptions of such a 
model. Consequently, it will be assumed that agents have optimal univariate 
expectations. In other words, agents are rational in the sense that they use past 
information on inflation to predict future inflation; however, they are irrational in the 
sense that they do not use any other information. Therefore, agents only use 
univariate information optimally, but they do not use information on other 
variables.  
The motivation for assuming such an expectation formation is that this near 
rational behavior reduces the cost of gathering and processing information (Ball, 
2000b). However, naive expectations are also “near-rational-rule-of-thumb”, when, 
for some agents, such a cost is relatively larger than the gains from improved 
inflation forecasts (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985). Therefore, as an alternative to optimal 
univariate expectations, another near rationality as implied by naive expectations 
will be tested. 
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These tests will be followed by the comparison of the performance of these 
alternative sets of near rational behavior. As a benchmark, Lucas (1976) critique is 
crucial. In other words, in the search for a better model, the criterion is to select the 
model that captures the monetary policy shift. The analysis covers two sub-periods 
from 1990 to 1993, and from 1995 to 1999, between which, Turkish economy has 
undergone a monetary policy change, such that, in the first period, capital inflows 
were not sterilized, whereas, in the second period, the Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey (CBRT) implemented sterilized intervention policy (Emir et al., 2000). 
Also, the first sub-period is the “relatively moderate” inflation period, whereas the 
second one is the “relatively higher” inflation period. This analysis by sub-periods 
helps one to find the model of sticky prices that captures this change in the level of 
inflation as well as the monetary policy shift, and the overall analysis reveals 
whether naive expectations or optimal univariate expectations are a near-rule-of-
thumb in a high inflation country like Turkey.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section gives an 
overview of sticky price models and discusses how these models under rational 
expectations assumption fail to explain the key facts about macro economy. More 
specifically, these models cannot explain the inflationary inertia and the output costs 
of reducing inflation. Then, the section argues how, when one relaxes the assumption 
of rational expectations, i.e. assuming naive expectations, these models perform 
better empirically, but then, they would be subject to Lucas (1976) critique. Another 
alternative then is not to totally abandon the assumption of rationality, but assume 
near rationality. In other words, agents only use univariate information optimally, but 
they do not use information on other variables. 
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In the next section, a sticky price model of one-period prices under optimal 
univariate expectation formation is adopted to Turkish economy. This section also 
includes a detailed data analysis and empirical evidence. Following section analyzes 
the response of inflation and output to a one-unit inflation shock. More specifically, 
we compare the impulse responses of the model under the restriction that the 
expectations are optimal univariate to the unrestricted case where we analyze the 
impulse responses in a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model of inflation and output. 
As an alternative to optimal univariate expectations, we also analyze the impulse 
responses of the model under the assumption that expectations are naive, and 
compare it to the VAR model of the earlier exercise. The results confirm that the 
model under optimal univariate expectations performs better than the model under 
naive expectations. Finally, the last section concludes this study.  
2.2 Inflation Persistence 
After the introduction in the previous section, this section will give an overview on 
models of inflation persistence. However, an analysis on persistent or “sticky” 
inflation models requires a thorough inquiry of New Keynesian sticky price models 
as a starter. New Keynesian sticky price models explain why money matters, i.e. 
why monetary policy can affect real variables such as output. However, the 
conventional staggered contracts models do not predict why it is costly to reduce 
inflation. In fact, these sticky price models predict that inflation can be brought down 
without depressing output or employment. Therefore, according to these models, 
even though prices are sticky, inflation is not, and with the appropriate monetary 
policy, inflation can be reduced at no cost as long as the inflation expectations 
change as the inflation changes. 
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2.2.1 An Overview of Sticky Price Models 
Models such as Taylor (1979,1980) or Calvo (1983) suggest that, if expectations are 
in line with the new path of monetary growth, a lower rate of money growth need not 
cause output loss even if there is stickiness in the level of wages. Yet, there is 
consensus among economists that disinflations reduce output. For instance, Blinder 
(1987) estimates 2-percentage point of decrease in employment for every 1-
percentage drop in inflation rate in the U.S. According to Sachs (1985), estimates of 
the “sacrifice ratio” for the United States range from 3 to 18. Surprisingly, Ball 
(1990) finds that, with credible policy and a realistic specification of staggering, a 
quick disinflation can in fact cause a boom rather than a recession.  
There are different views from different authors about why disinflation is 
costly. According to New Classical economists, with imperfect credibility, 
disinflation would create output losses. On the other hand, New Keynesian 
economists explain why reducing inflation requires a loss of output by modifying 
traditional sticky price models.  
A common practice in modifying the traditional sticky price models is to 
relax the assumption of perfectly rational expectations (Ball, 1991; Roberts, 1995, 
1997, 1998). In other words, if expectations are less-than-perfectly rational, then 
expectations may not adjust in a way that is consistent with costless disinflation. 
Another practice, unlike in standard sticky price models where levels of employment 
are related to the levels of real wages, is to relate levels of employment to the growth 
in real wages and explain why it is costly to reduce inflation. Therefore, instead of a 
sticky price model, we now have a “sticky inflation” model as proposed by Fuhrer 
and Moore (1995a, 1995b). 
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2.2.2 Staggered Contracts Model under Rational Expectations 
Models that have stressed wage or price rigidities can be categorized under 
“Staggered Contracts Models” and these include works by Fischer (1977), Phelps 
and Taylor (1977), Taylor (1979,1980) and Calvo (1983). The first two of these 
models postulate that wages or prices are set by multi-period contracts where in each 
period, a fraction of the contracts expire and are renewed for the coming period. 
These multi-period contract models imply gradual adjustment of the price level to 
nominal disturbances. Therefore, aggregate disturbances have real effects. More 
specifically, Taylor (1979) proposed the following  
ttttt yxExx γ++= +− )(2
1
11  (2.1) 
tttt vwym −+=  (2.2) 
tt gwm =  (2.3) 
)(
2
1
1−+= ttt xxw  
(2.4) 
ttt vwy +−= β  (2.5) 
)(
2
1
1−+= ttt xxp  
(2.6) 
Where, xt is the contract wage set at the start of period t for periods t and t+1, 
yt is the excess demand in period t, mt is the money supply, wt, is the aggregate wage 
level, pt is the aggregate price level and vt is a shock. β is a positive policy parameter 
indicating the degree of accommodation of aggregate demand to wage changes and γ 
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is a positive parameter showing the degree of sensitivity of current wage to excess 
demand. All variables are in logs. 
In Taylor (1980), wages are linked to prices with a simple price-mark up 
equation, so that the implications for wages and wage inflation are the same as those 
for prices and price inflation. For convenience, assuming a mark up factor from 
wages to prices of unity, the log of wage and the log of price index, wt and pt are 
defined as the simple average of the contract wage xt negotiated in period t and t-1.  
The model assumes that wage contracts last one year and that decision dates 
are evenly staggered: half of the contracts are set in January and the other half in 
July. Wage determination is given by the first equation and the second equation 
gives us the demand for money. The following equation is the policy rule for the 
money supply. Next equation is the wage equation that shows aggregate wage as an 
arithmetic average of contract wages set at period t and t-1, and the following 
equation is the price equation. The final equation is the simple aggregate demand 
relation derived from the first three equations. 
Rearranging xt equation, and substituting xt in price equation, we obtain: 
)(
2
)(
2
1
111 −+= +++= tttttt yypEpp
γ
 (2.7) 
By including lagged values of price and output, the Taylor model imparts 
considerable inertia to the level of wages and prices as intended. However, the 
equation bears less desirable implications for the inflation rate. Defining, pit as, pt–pt-
1, and rearranging, we get: 
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tttt yE γpipi += −1  (2.8) 
Hence, the persistence in inflation stems from the persistence in the driving 
term yt. Therefore, a one-period shock to output will affect inflation for one period 
only. Hence, the staggered contract specification adds no inflation persistence of its 
own. Similarly, a one-period inflation shock affects inflation only for a single period. 
Unless the shock itself persists, the effect of the shock on inflation is not persistent.  
Fuhrer and Moore (1995a, 1995b) derived the following model where agents 
care about relative real wages over the life of the contract. Thus the contract equation 
and inflation equations are: 
tttttttt ypxEpxpx γ+−+−=− ++−− ))((2
1
1111  (2.9) 
)(
2
)(
2
1
111 tttttt yyE +++= −+−
γ
pipipi  (2.10) 
Fuhrer and Moore (1995a, 1995b) show that the above “relative contracting 
model“ imparts persistence both to the level of wages and prices as well as the 
changes in wages and inflation. According to the above equation, changes in wages 
are set relative to the expected changes in prices and the expected level of aggregate 
economic activity, and hence, the model implies persistence in inflation.  
2.2.3 Staggered Contracts Model under Alternative Expectations Formation 
Staggered contracts model of the previous section imparts persistence to the level of 
prices rather than the changes in prices, i.e. inflation. Roberts (1995,1997,1998) on 
the other hand, shows that by relaxing the assumption that agents are perfectly 
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rational, inflation inertia arises in the traditional staggered contracts model. 
According to Roberts (1995,1997,1998), the model that Fuhrer and Moore (1995a, 
1995b) estimated is observationally equivalent to a model with sticky prices in which 
expectations are simply extrapolations of last period’s inflation. So, he concludes 
that it is not possible to determine whether the source of costly disinflation is sticky 
inflation or less-than-perfectly rational expectations. Therefore, as discussed by 
Roberts (1995,1997,1998), persistent inflation can be brought by less-than-perfectly 
rational expectations. The equation that incorporates less-than-perfectly rational 
inflation expectations is as follows: 
)(
2
1
111 −++ += ttttt ME pipipi  (2.11) 
Where, “M” is used to distinguish rational expectations or mathematical 
expectations from other possible expectation formation mechanisms. The above 
specification implies that inflation expectations are not perfectly rational, but rather, 
partly rational. In other words, inflation expectations are halfway between perfectly 
rational expectations and adaptive expectations. Roberts (1995, 1997,1998) finds that 
sticky price model with this added specification performs better than sticky inflation 
model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995a, 1995b). Furthermore, Roberts (1995, 1997, 
1998) discuss the surveys of inflation, namely Michigan Consumer Survey and 
Livingston Survey of Economists, the result of which suggest that expectations are 
neither purely adaptive nor perfectly rational. 
In addition to the evidence for not-quite-rational expectations by the above 
model, Fuhrer and Moore (1995b) also find that for pure forecasting purposes, a pure 
forward looking model does not improve upon a naive model. For policy 
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evaluations, a mixed naive/forward looking price specification yields more 
reasonable long run behavior. Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) show that recent 
macroeconomic models based on microeconomic foundations show poor empirical 
performance since these models assume rational expectations. The authors suggest 
that these models should be re-formulated to incorporate naive expectations. 
2.2.4 Rational Expectations versus Naive Expectations 
Recent studies on inflation persistence have reached a consensus on why inflation is 
persistent, a characteristic of inflation that the standard staggered contracts model 
fails to explain: Expectations are not perfectly rational. This result requires some 
attention. Rational expectations have been one of the major themes in 
macroeconomic research over the last two decades. Yet, as the above models show, 
rational expectations do not explain the empirical facts about inflation, i.e. 
persistence in inflation. Therefore, first, we need to justify why agents may not be 
perfectly rational.  
Rational expectations are based on the assumption that agents should not 
make systematic mistakes. This is because rational expectations are derived from the 
optimization principle according to which, it is not plausible to assume that 
individuals make predictable errors, and yet, they take no action to revise their rule 
to form expectations.  
However, there are various reasons why inflation expectations may not be 
perfectly rational. First of all, rational expectations hypothesis assumes that agents 
have full access to the knowledge about the state of the economy at no cost. Yet, as 
Ball (2000b) and Roberts (1998) discuss, most likely, agents incur cost in gathering 
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information about the state of the economy. Due to the cost of gathering information, 
agents may deviate from perfect rationality. 
Another reason for near rational expectations as explained by Fuhrer (1998) 
and Roberts (1998) is “habit formation”. In other words, expectation formation is 
“stubborn”, and adjusts only gradually to rationality. Therefore, inflation 
expectations are weighted average of what they were in the last period and what they 
should be currently. It is apparent that such a specification is also a departure from 
perfect rationality. 
Therefore, one can conclude that staggered price models of Taylor (1980) 
and Calvo (1983) fail to explain the key facts about macro economy, i.e. they cannot 
explain the inflationary inertia and the output costs of reducing inflation. Some 
authors suggest that these models should relax the assumption of rational 
expectations. These authors argue that some or all agents have naive expectations 
such that expected inflation is simply equal to past inflation (Ball, 1991; Roberts, 
1997, Rudebusch and Svensson, 1998,1999).  
However, one cannot simply accept staggered contracts model under the 
assumption of naive behavior because of Lucas (1976) critique. Although, the model 
under this setting fits the stylized facts about inflation in the current monetary 
regime, expectations change if the monetary regime changes, the effects of which 
cannot be fully captured by naive expectations. Therefore, naive expectations are 
likely to produce misleading predictions about the effects of a monetary policy 
change. On the other hand, the assumption of rational expectations should not be 
totally abandoned, either. But instead, one should try to find a model of inflation 
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persistence based on optimization rules, which also incorporates imperfectly rational 
expectations 
2.2.5 Optimal Univariate Expectations: Another Alternative 
Ball (2000b) proposed a less-than-fully-rational model of expectations, where agents 
have optimal univariate expectations.1 In other words, agents are rational in the sense 
that, they use past information on inflation to predict future inflation; however they 
do not use any other information. Therefore, agents only use univariate information 
optimally, but they do not use information on other variables. This near rational 
behavior reduces the costs of gathering and processing information.  
Naive expectations may not be near rational, and is subject to Lucas (1976) 
critique, since, persistence of inflation may rely on a certain monetary regime and 
there may not be this persistence in other regimes.2 Therefore, simply assuming 
naive expectations in the presence of cost of information gathering and processing is 
subject to Lucas (1976) critique. However, the assumption of rational expectations 
produces unrealistic predictions about the current regime. Therefore, in order to 
explain the inflation dynamics, one has to find a new model of expectations that can 
also make plausible predictions about other monetary regimes. 
                                                     
1
 Earlier works on univariate forecasts include studies such as Sargent (1973) and McCallum (1976), 
who referred to univariate forecasts as “ partly rational expectations”. Staiger et al. (1996) also used 
univariate forecasts as proxies for expected inflation in order to estimate Phillips curves. 
2
 Gordon (1980), and Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) find that coefficients on lagged inflation for the 
pre-1914 Phillips curve has smaller coefficients than the coefficients of the Phillips curve in the 
postwar period. This evidence suggests a monetary policy change. 
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The drawback of setting up a model of near rationality is the difficulty in 
which one should decide on the degree of non-rationality.3 For instance, Ball (2000b) 
assumes that, agents are non-rational in the sense that they do not exploit all 
information in the economy. However, these agents are rational in the sense that they 
make full use of information on inflation rate when predicting future inflation rates. 
In other words, the deviation from rationality is due to the fact that agents make 
univariate forecasts on inflation by ignoring relevant variables such as output and 
interest rates. But these univariate forecasts are optimal since agents use inflation 
data as best as they can. Such a univariate forecasting of inflation minimizes on cost, 
since it requires examining only a single variable. Ball (2000b) shows that both for 
post-1960 and pre-1914 US data, the univariate expectations are close to being 
rational.  
According to Ball (2000b), naive expectations are near rational only if the 
inflation is highly persistent, but univariate forecasts are near rational in many 
monetary regimes. He computes errors from multivariate forecasts of inflation based 
on lags of inflation, output, and a short term interest rate. The multivariate forecasts 
produce greater inflation variability for the earlier period. The univariate forecasts of 
inflation for both periods produce slightly higher variability, but the size of the 
forecast improvements from adding these variables is modest, so it is plausible to 
assume that near rational agents would ignore output and interest rate when 
forecasting inflation. Finally, the standard errors of forecasting equation using naive 
expectations are higher than the standard errors of forecasting equation using 
                                                     
3
 When assuming deviations from rationality and assuming near rationality, it is hard to decide on 
how much one is far away from being rational since there are many ways one can be non-rational. 
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univariate expectations. Especially, for the pre-1914 period, the magnitude of the 
standard errors implies that naive expectations are far from rationality. 
2.3 Theoretical Models of Price Setting 
After the debate on expectations in the previous sections, this section describes two 
models of staggered price adjustment where both are based on the canonical 
macroeconomic model of imperfect competition. The former follows Taylor (1979) 
and Roberts (1995) where each firms sets its price for two periods and adjustment is 
staggered across firms. In the second model, each firm adjusts its price every period 
and nominal rigidity arises because some firms set prices before observing the 
current state.  
Both of the above models are built on the following theoretical model where 
the economy contains monopolistically competitive firms such that the individual in 
this economy is the sole producer of a good, the price of which is again set by the 
individual. Labor is the only input to the production process. The individual’s 
production function is simply 
ii LQ =  (2.12) 
Where, Li is the amount that the individual works, and Qi is the amount that is 
produced. There exists a labor market where each individual can either sell or hire 
labor. The log-linear demand for each good is given by the following equation: 
)( ppyq ii −−= η  (2.13) 
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Where, y is the aggregate real income, qi is the demand per producer of good 
i, p is the aggregate price level, and pi is the price of the good i. All variables are in 
logs. y is equal to the average across goods qi’s, and similarly, p is the average of the 
pi’s.  
Consumption depends on income divided by the price index, p, and income is 
the sum of profit income and labor income, such that 
P
WLQWPC iii +−= )(  (2.14) 
Where, (Pi – W) Qi is the sum of profit income, and WLi is the labor income. 
Utility depends positively on consumption and negatively on the amount worked. It 
can be expressed as: 
γ
γ iii
LCU 1−=  (2.15) 
The above equation can be rewritten as 
γ
γ i
iii
i LP
WLQWPU 1)( −+−=  (2.16) 
Equation (2.13) when converted into levels gives 
η−
= )/( PPYQ ii  (2.17) 
Substituting equation (2.17) into equation (2.16) gives 
γ
η
γ i
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−
 (2.18) 
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The individual has two choice variables, the price of his good Pi and the 
amount of labor Li. Therefore, derivative of the utility function with respect to Pi 
when set to zero gives 
0)/1()/()()/(
1
=
−−
−−−
P
PPPYWPPPY iii
ηη η
 
(2.19) 
Rearranging the above first-order condition gives 
P
W
P
Pi
1−
=
η
η
 (2.20) 
The first-order condition for Li is 
01 =− −γiLP
W
 (2.21) 
Which, when rearranged, gives the labor supply function in terms of the real 
wage as 
)1/(1)( −= γ
P
WLi  (2.22) 
Which implies that the producer with market power sets price as a mark up 
over marginal cost with the size of the mark up determined by the elasticity of 
demand. In equilibrium, each individual works the same amount and produces the 
same amount. Equilibrium output is therefore equal to the level of labor supply. 
Using this fact and the equations (2.12) and (2.22), real wage as a function of output 
can be expressed as 
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 (2.23) 
Equation (2.23) when substituted into equation (2.20) gives each producer’s 
equilibrium or “desired” relative price in terms of aggregate output. 
1
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The above equation when expressed in logs can be rewritten as 
yppi )1()1ln(
*
−+
−
=− γ
η
η
 (2.25) 
vyc +=  (2.26) 
For simplicity, the constant c in the above equation can be normalized to 
zero, thus the desired price of individual i in period t is 
ttit vypp +=
*
 (2.27) 
2.3.1 Staggered Price Model with Prices Set for Two Periods 
The model with staggered prices is based on an economy described as in the above 
theoretical model. In this model, a firm sets a fixed price for two periods. Let xt 
denote the price set by firms in period t for t and t+1. This price is chosen after firms 
observe the state of the economy at t. Following Taylor (1979) and Roberts (1995), 
firms set xt equal to the average of expected optimal prices at t and t+1. Therefore, 
we have 
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Where Et denotes firms’ expectations at time t.4 Price setting is staggered and 
assuming that equal number of firms adjusts prices each period, the price level pt 
becomes equal to the average of xt and xt-1 and therefore we have 
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2
1
1−+= ttt xxp  (2.29) 
The inflation pit is by definition equal to pt - pt-1 , so therefore 
tttttttttttt yEyyEy
vEE εpipipi ++++++=
−−+−+ )(2)(2
1
11111  (2.30) 
Where, the error term εt captures the inflation shock not explained by the 
model. As usual, the error term is serially uncorrelated and uncorrelated with yt. 
The above equation is a version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, where, 
inflation depends on expected inflation in the current and future periods and on 
output. 
2.3.2 Staggered Price Model with Prices Set for One Period 
In the second price adjustment model used by Ball (2000b), firms’ desired prices are 
again given by equation (2.27), where each firm sets its price one period at a time. 
However, a fraction w of firms must set prices one period in advance. This “sticky 
price” sector follows the following rule to set their prices such that 
                                                     
4
 Et may or may not equal a mathematical expectation depending on the kind of expectation formation 
we assume. 
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*
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s
t pEp −=  (2.31) 
The other firms set their prices after observing the current state. The 
“flexible-price” sector set their prices according to 
*
t
f
t pp =  (2.32) 
The aggregate price level therefore is a weighted average of the prices set 
according to the above rules. Hence, 
f
t
s
tt pwwpp )1( −+=  (2.33) 
Combining equation (2.27), (2.31), and (2.32), we get 
tttttt y
w
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 (2.34) 
Inflation, pit, is the difference between current and previous period’s price 
level. Therefore, subtracting pt-1 from both sides of the above equation, we get the 
inflation rate as 
ttttttttt y
w
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1111  (2.35) 
Since, Et-1pt-1=pt-1, the above equation can be rewritten as 
ttttttt y
w
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11  (2.36) 
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Again, the above equation represents a Phillips curve, where, however this 
time the relation is simpler than the relation implied by the Phillips curve equation of 
the previous model (Equation 2.30). 
2.4. Testing the Model with Prices Set for One Period 
Following the discussion on alternative models of staggered prices in the previous 
section, this section will provide detailed information on the data set and the 
econometric methodology utilized in this study. Bakaya et al. (1999) provide 
information on the seasonal movements of the sub-items of Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) and Wholesale Price Index (WPI), and conclude that prices are adjusted every 
month. Using this fact about the price indices, we find it plausible to use the 
staggered model with one-period prices. Hence, we use monthly data to carry out the 
analysis. 
In order to evaluate the performance of the model with respect to the level of 
the inflation, the analysis is on two sub-periods, from 1990 to 1993 and from 1995 to 
1999. The first sub-period is the “relatively lower” inflation period, whereas, the 
second sub-period is “the relatively higher” inflation period given average annual 
inflation figures of about 60 percent in the first sub-period and average annual 
inflation figures of about 80 percent after the 1994 crisis.  
2.4.1 Diagnostic Tests on Data 
Our data on inflation comes from the seasonally adjusted, differenced-logged Private 
Manufacturing Price Index.5 The output is the seasonally adjusted, HP filtered 
                                                     
5 The inflation series, therefore, corresponds to “core inflation” or “underlying inflation”. Ball (1998, 
2000b) argues that this measure of inflation filters out the transitory changes in inflation. 
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logged industrial production index of the manufacturing industries.6 The unit root 
tests of these series suggest that the series are stationary (See Table 2.1). All data are 
publicly available from the dataset of the CBRT.7  
Table 2.1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests on Inflation and Output, 
Period 1:1990-1993 and Period 2:1995-1999 
 Period1: 1990-1993 Period 2: 1995-1999 
  Y  Y 
ADF Test -3.834* -4.431* -3.088** -3.383* 
1% critical value -3.616 -3.614 -3.604 -3.603 
5% critical value -1.948 -1.948 -1.946 -1.946 
10% critical -1.620 -1.620 -1.619 -1.619 
*  Rejects the hypothesis of a unit root at 1% critical level.  
**Rejects the hypothesis of a unit root at 5% critical level. 
We further analyzed the data following Metin-Özcan et al. (2001). In order to 
test the persistence of inflation, the authors use a technique by Cochrane (1988) 
where variance ratio test on inflation series is carried out. Cochrane (1988) argues 
that the class of time series models can be most commonly represented either as 
                                                     
6
 Ball (2000b) uses GDP deflator to calculate the inflation and real GDP for output. However, we do 
not have these series in monthly frequency. Yet, we measured these series in “synthetic” form using 
Fernandez (1980) method. The method uses the distribution of a correlated high frequency series to 
create a “synthetic” higher frequency series for the lower frequency series. In our case, we found GDP 
to be highly correlated with Industrial Production Index and GDP deflator to be highly correlated with 
Wholesale Production Index. Instead of using these synthetic series however, we decided to use the 
high frequency series. 
7
 CBRT provides General Statistics through Electronic Data Delivery System (EDDS). For more 
information, visit http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html. 
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temporary deviations about a trend or as a random walk. In other words, on one 
extreme lies a time series model where the behavior of the series xt can be described 
as follows: 

∞
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−
+=
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jtjtt abx ε  (2.37) 
Where, bt describes a trend and t is a random disturbance term. If 
∞
=
=
0j
jtja ε is 
a stationary stochastic process, then xt is called trend-stationary. As a result, a decline 
in xt below the trend today has no effect on the forecasts of the level of xt in the far 
future. 
On the other extreme of the time series models lies a random walk model 
where 
ttt xx εµ ++= −1  (2.38) 
Such that, fluctuations in xt are permanent in the sense that a shock to the 
disturbance term t carries its impact over to the forecasts Et(xt+j )for the indefinite 
future.  
One can model a series whose fluctuations are partly temporary and partly 
permanent as a combination of a stationary series and a random walk. The random 
walk component of the time series model carries the permanent part of a change and 
the stationary series carries the temporary part of a change. Then, the second 
question is how important the random walk component is as far as the behavior of 
the series is concerned. More specifically, Cochrane (1988) asks the question of how 
large the variance of shocks to the random walk component of a time series is when 
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compared with the variance of yearly growth rates of the series. If the variance of the 
shocks to the random walk component is zero, the series is trend-stationary and long-
term forecast does not change in response to the shocks. If the variance of the shocks 
to the random walk component is equal to the variance of the first differences, the 
series is a pure random walk. However, there is continuous range of possibilities 
between zero and one and beyond one. The decomposition into stationary and 
random walk components is thus a convenient way of thinking about the properties 
of a time series. 
As stated by Cochrane (1988), unit root tests have low power in 
distinguishing between stationary series with no random walk component and 
stationary series plus a very small random walk component such that a series with a 
unit root is equivalent to a series that is composed of a random walk and a stationary 
component. Tests for a unit root are attempts to distinguish between series that have 
no random walk component and series that have a random walk component. So, 
using Cochrane variance ratio test is important in terms of measuring how important 
the unit root or random walk component is for the behavior of the series. 
The technique followed is first measuring the size of a random walk 
component of the inflation series from the variance of their logged differences. 
Assuming that inflation series is a pure random walk model, the variance of its k-
differences grows linearly with the difference k: i.e., var(xt-xt-k)=k3. 
On the other hand, if the series is stationary about a trend, the variance of its 
k-differences approaches a constant, which is k times the unconditional variance of 
the series. In other words, 
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2)var( εσkxx ktt →− −  (2.39) 
If the series is a random walk, then plot of (1/k)var(xt -xt-k)as a function of k is 
a constant line at 3. However, if the series is trend-stationary, the plot should 
decline towards zero. 
Suppose that fluctuations in inflation are partly permanent and partly 
temporary. Then, the inflation series can be modeled as a combination of a stationary 
series and a random walk, and the plot of k versus (1/k)var(xt -xt-k) should settle 
down to the variance of the shock of the random walk component. 
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Figure 2.1. Cochrane Variance Ratio of Monthly Inflation Rate in Turkey 
Figure 2.1 shows the 1/k times the variance of k-differences divided by the 
variance of first differences of monthly inflation series for periods, 1990-1993 and 
1995-1999. Since the 1/k times the variance of k-differences settles down to about 
one-tenth of the variance of the first differences, the Figure 2.1 suggests that the 
innovation variance of the random walk component is about one-tenth of the 
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variance of the monthly changes in inflation. Therefore, we can conclude that 
monthly changes in inflation contain a large permanent component.  
2.4.2 Econometric Methodology 
After the previous section on the detailed analysis of the data, we will proceed by 
econometrically testing our theoretical model under alternative assumptions 
regarding expectations formation. More specifically, in the first alternative, 
expectations are assumed to be optimal univariate, whereas, in the second 
alternative, expectations are assumed to be naive. Perfectly rational expectations are 
ruled out such that going back to the earlier section on Models of Price Setting, we 
have the Phillips curve equation defined as below: 
ttttttt y
w
vwyvEE εpipi +−++=
−−
)1(
11  (2.40) 
Assuming rational expectations, when the expected variables are replaced 
with actual variables plus expectational errors, we would have 
ttttt uy
w
v
+++= εpipi  (2.41) 
Where, ut=Et-1pit-pit +v(Et-1yt-yt). The above equation can be rewritten as  
ttt uy
w
v
++= ε0  (2.42) 
One can see that the estimation of such an equation gives us v=0, which is 
contradictory to the model’s initial assumption that v>0. This confirms the failure of 
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the model under rational expectations. Therefore, the assumption of perfect 
rationality is ruled out in this theoretical setting.8 
2.4.3 The Model with Optimal Univariate Expectations  
Assuming that the optimal univariate expectations of inflation and output are 
generated by Autoregressive (AR) process, the lag of which will be set according to 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). In the following step, the expectation terms in 
the Phillips curve equation (2.40) will be replaced by their optimal univariate 
forecasts. Since the frequency of the data is monthly, trying lags from 1 to 12, and 
based on AIC, for the 1990-1993 period, it can be concluded that the inflation 
follows an AR(1) and output follows an AR(7) process, and inflation follows an 
AR(3) and output follows an AR(5) process in the second period, 1995-1999 . 
In the second step, these forecasting models are substituted into equation 
(2.40) to replace the expected inflation and expected output terms, and consequently, 
inflation is obtained in terms of lagged inflation and current and lagged output. More 
specifically, the Phillips curve equation now is: 
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(2.44) 
                                                     
8
 Peker and Tutu (1999) conclude that inflation expectations in Turkey are far from being perfectly 
rational. However, they are not purely adaptive, either. 
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Equations (2.43) and (2.44) are the restricted Phillips curve equations, where 
the expected inflation and output terms are replaced with the equations for inflation 
and output described by the AR processes for period 1 and period 2, respectively. 9 
After substituting the AR coefficients, ’s and ’s, there are two parameters to be 
estimated: v and (1-w) v/w. The next step therefore is to estimate these 2 coefficients 
v and w. 
The restricted Phillips curve equations (2.43) and (2.44), before ’s and ’s 
are replaced, can be rewritten as 
ttttttt y
w
vwyvEE εpipi +−+=−
−−
)1(
11  (2.45) 
Therefore, when the optimal univariate expectations are substituted into the 
above equation, the regression of the above equation will yield the v and w 
coefficients. 10 
Table 2.2. Restricted Phillips Curve Estimates under Univariate Expectations 
Independent 
Variables 
Period 1: 1990-1993 Period 2: 1995-1999 
 Coefficients SE Coefficients SE 
Yt -0.031 0.029 0.045 0.028 
Et-1Yt 0.083 0.058 -0.041 0.035 
SE 0.007 0.006 
                                                     
9
 The parameters, ’s and ’s for the first period are 1=0.35, 1 =-0.15, 2 =-0.08, 3 =-0.11, 4 =-
0.23, 5=0.18, 6 =0.28, 7=-0.05, and 1=0.38, 2=0.32, 3=0.02, 1 =0.42, 2=0.28, 3 =-0.29, 4 
=0.01 and 5=0.28. 
10
 For the first period, Et-1t=1t-1 and Et-1Yt=1Yt-1+2Yt-2+3Yt-3+4Yt-4+5Yt-5+6Yt-6+7Yt-7, and for 
the second period, Et-1t=1t-1+2t-2+3t-3 and Et-1Yt=1Yt-1+2Yt-2+3Yt-3+4Yt-4+5Yt-5. 
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Table 2.2 summarizes the regression results. For the first period, the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) estimates of these coefficients are both positive. We get v as 
0.083 with a standard error of 0.058 and (1-w) v/w is equal to –0.031 with a standard 
error of 0.029. Substituting v into the latter coefficient, we find w to be 1.59, which 
is contradictory to the model. One should remember that, w is the weight assigned to 
the sticky price sector in the economy, and obviously the weights assigned to each 
sector have to add up to unity. Yet, the coefficient, (1-w)v/w is not statistically 
significant and v is significant at 85 percent. Therefore, given that v is statistically 
different than zero, (1-w)v/w can be zero, if and only if w is equal to 1, which then 
would not contradict the model. For the second period, the coefficient v is negative 
and statistically insignificant and the coefficient w is negative and (1-w)v/w is 
significant at 89 percent. 
The next step is to substitute the values for v, w, ’s and ’s in order to get 
the restricted Phillips curve equation (2.43) and (2.44). In the following step, the 
unrestricted Phillips curve equation is estimated. More specifically, for the first 
period, inflation is regressed on lagged inflation, current output, and 7 lags of output. 
For the second period, the estimation of the unrestricted Phillips curve equation 
requires regression of inflation on 3 lags of itself, current output, and 5 lags of 
output. Tables 2.3-2.4 report coefficient errors and standard errors of this estimation 
as well as the coefficients in the restricted Phillips curve. 
One cannot reject the hypothesis that the unrestricted coefficient of lagged 
inflation equals the restricted coefficient on lagged inflation for both periods. In the 
first period, the coefficient of the lagged inflation term is 0.12 in the unrestricted 
Phillips curve equation, and 0.35 in the restricted Phillips curve equation, and these 
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coefficients are not statistically different from each other. For the second period, the 
sum of the coefficients on lagged inflation terms is 0.77 in the unrestricted Phillips 
curve equation, and 0.72 in the restricted Phillips curve equation. The change in 
cumulative effect of past inflation on current inflation from period 1 to period 2 is 
consistent with our assumption that inflation has become more persistent in the latter 
period. Optimal univariate forecasts are able to capture this shift in the same way 
that the unrestricted equation captured. 
Table 2.3. Unrestricted and Restricted Phillips Curves Under Optimal Univariate 
Expectations and Naive Expectations, Period 1: 1990-1993 
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Optimal 
Univariate 
Expectations 
Naive 
Expectations 
t-1 0.116 (0.171) 0.346 1 
Yt -0.031 (0.027) -0.031 -0.032 
Yt-1 -0.043 (0.026) -0.013 -0.039 
Yt-2 -0.040 (0.026) -0.007 0 
Yt-3 -0.054 (0.027) -0.009 0 
Yt-4 -0.002 (0.029) -0.019 0 
Yt-5 0.044 (0.026) 0.015 0 
Yt-6 0.035 (0.026) 0.023 0 
Yt-7 0.033 (0.024) -0.005 0 
 36
Table 2.4. Unrestricted and Restricted Phillips Curves Under Optimal Univariate 
Expectations and Naive Expectations, Period 2: 1995-1999 
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Optimal 
Univariate 
Expectations 
Naive 
Expectations 
t-1 0.315 (0.155) 0.383 1 
t-2 0.343 (0.151) 0.318 0 
t-3 0.108 (0.151) 0.015 0 
Yt 0.042 (0.028) 0.045 0.040 
Yt-1 -0.001 (0.029) -0.017 -0.046 
Yt-2 -0.023 (0.027) -0.012 0 
Yt-3 -0.030 (0.028) 0.012 0 
Yt-4 -0.006 (0.026) -0.005 0 
Yt-5 -0.011 (0.027) -0.012 0 
2.4.4 The Model with Naive Expectations  
We proceed by testing the model under naive expectations. In this case, expectation 
terms are simply replaced by their corresponding lagged values. In other words, the 
Phillips curve equation (2.36) would now be: 
tttt vy
w
w
vy −+=−
−−
1
11pipi  (2.46) 
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One can easily estimate the parameters v and (1-w)v/w by OLS through 
regressing the difference between current inflation and past inflation on current 
output and lagged output. 
Table 2.5. Restricted Phillips Curve Estimates under Naive Expectations 
Independent 
Variables 
Period 1: 1990-1993 Period 2: 1995-1999 
 Coefficients SE Coefficients SE 
Yt -0.032 0.027 0.040 0.026 
Et-1Yt -0.039 0.027 -0.046 0.026 
SE 0.009 0.010 
Tables 2.3-2.5 present the results of the regression. For the first period, the 
OLS estimates of these coefficients are both positive. We get v as –0.039, with a 
standard error of 0.027, and the coefficient on current output, (1-w)v/w, is found to 
be equal to –0.032, with a standard error of 0.027. When v is substituted into the 
latter expression (1-w)v/w, w is found to be 0.55. Coefficient v is statistically 
significant at 85 percent. Therefore, one can conclude that the empirical results 
contradict with the theory that v is greater than zero, and hence, for the first period, 
naive expectations can be ruled out. For the second period, coefficient v is –0.040 
with a standard error of 0.026, and is statistically insignificant. The coefficient w is 
positive, however, exceeds unity and (1-w) v/w is insignificant.  
The following step is the estimation of an unrestricted Phillips curve equation 
for both periods under the assumption of naive expectations, and then the 
coefficients of the restricted Phillips curve equation are compared to the coefficients 
of the unrestricted Phillips curve equation. According to Tables 2.3-2.4, for both 
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periods, one can strongly reject the hypothesis that the coefficient of the lagged 
inflation in the unrestricted Phillips curve equation equals the coefficient of the 
lagged inflation in the restricted Phillips curve equation.  
The restricted model under naive expectations shows a very poor 
performance in terms of capturing the effect of past inflation. For the first period, the 
cumulative effect of past inflation on current inflation is 0.12, and naive expectations 
impose this effect to be equal to unity. However, these two are statistically different 
from each other. In the second period, the overall effect of past inflation on current 
inflation sums up to 0.77. However, again, naive expectations imply that this effect 
is equal to unity. Therefore, from period 1 to period 2, although inflation becomes 
more persistent as implied by the increase in the size of the sum of the coefficients 
on past inflation, the naive expectations fail to capture this shift. Also, in both 
periods optimal univariate expectations produce smaller standard errors than naive 
expectations. As inflation gets more persistent, i.e. in the second period, the optimal 
univariate expectations produce smaller standard error than in the first period. As for 
the naive expectations, the standard errors increase in the second period, again 
indicating the better performance of the optimal univariate expectations as the 
persistence and the level of inflation increase. 
2.5 Impulse Responses to an Inflation Shock 
In this part of the empirical analysis, the restricted and unrestricted responses 
of inflation and output to an inflation shock will be compared, again under 
alternative assumptions about expectations. More specifically, in the first alternative, 
assuming optimal univariate expectations, unrestricted Phillips curve equation from 
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the previous section will be combined with an equation for output in terms of lagged 
output and lagged inflation. These two equations yield a VAR in recursive form, 
where current output affects inflation, but current inflation does not affect output. 
This is the unrestricted VAR model, and in the restricted VAR model, the inflation 
equation will be replaced by the restricted Phillips curve equation under optimal 
univariate expectations of the earlier section. Output equation will be kept 
unchanged.  
Same exercise will be repeated in the alternative setting where this time 
expectations are naive. Then, clearly, the unrestricted VAR model will be the same 
as in the case of the first alternative where expectations were assumed to be optimal 
univariate. The restricted VAR model will include the restricted Phillip curve 
equation under the assumption of naive expectations. In all alternatives, output 
equation is kept unchanged.  
In order the find the equation for output however, first, current inflation is 
simply regressed on its own lag and lagged output. Simultaneously, current output is 
regressed on lagged values of inflation and output. In other words, this is an 
atheoretical VAR model, where, the independent variables are only the lagged values 
of the dependent variables, whereas in the VAR model in recursive form, inflation is 
affected by the lagged values of output and inflation as well as the current output. 
We do this exercise only to find the optimal number of lags for inflation and output 
that affects current output. The lag number from 1 to 12 that minimizes AIC is found 
to be 2 for both periods. The output equation in this atheoretical VAR model, when 
plugged into VAR model in recursive form (whether it be restricted or unrestricted) 
finalizes the setting up of the model before we study the impulse responses. 
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We proceed as follows: First assuming optimal univariate expectations, both 
restricted and unrestricted VAR model in recursive form will be set up. Next, the 
responses of output and inflation to a one-unit shock in inflation will be analyzed and 
compared. Then, the same procedure will be repeated this time assuming that 
expectations are naive. 11 Before analyzing the effect of a nominal shock, the initial 
values of inflation and output are set to zero in the baseline scenario. 
2.5.1 The Model with Optimal Univariate Expectations 
In the first period, when faced with a temporary, unanticipated 1-percent decrease in 
inflation, in both models, inflation shows a sudden decrease and then increases back. 
It finally stabilizes around zero in both models. Although in both models inflation 
quickly converges to zero, in the unrestricted model, there is more variation in 
inflation, whereas in the restricted model, inflation follows a smoother stabilization 
towards zero. Yet, both models are able to capture the effect of a temporary inflation 
shock (See Figure A.1 in Appendix A). 
When the economy experiences an unanticipated and temporary inflation 
shock in the second period, inflation in both models, drops to –1 percent initially. 
The pattern that the inflation follows towards stabilization is similar in both 
restricted and unrestricted models. Inflation, decreasing further down –1, starts to 
gradually converge to zero. About 20 months later, the inflation settles around zero 
in both models. In the restricted model, inflation, initially, shows a slightly greater 
                                                     
11
 This procedure uses Win-solve package and Bootstrap method of stochastic simulation, where 
shocks are generated by repeatedly randomly drawing rows from the matrix of single equation 
residuals. The shocks drawn will asymptotically have the same distribution as the empirical 
distribution of the single equation residuals, and also this method does not assume normality.  
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decline than the inflation in the unrestricted model, yet settles at a higher plateau 
during convergence to zero (See Figure A.2 in Appendix A). 
For the first period, the response of output to a temporary inflation shock is 
very much alike in the unrestricted and restricted models. In both models, after the 
inflation shock, there is sudden drop in output followed by a sharp recovery. Output 
stabilizes around zero in both models, though more quickly and showing less 
variation in the restricted model under univariate expectations than in the 
unrestricted model (See Figure A.3 in Appendix A). 
In the second period, the temporary shock to inflation results in output loss 
like in the previous case. However, the recovery of output takes longer in period 2 
than in period 1. In period 1, it takes not more than 10 months for the output in both 
unrestricted and restricted model to stabilize, whereas in period 2, it takes about 30 
months before the output fully recovers. Yet, the initial drop in the output is less 
severe in period 2 than in period 1. However, the recovery is more gradual during 
this period than the previous period. The responses of output are very similar to each 
other in both periods. Therefore, one can conclude that the univariate expectations 
can successfully capture the effects of an inflation shock on output (See Figure A.4 
in Appendix A). 
2.5.2 The Model with Naive Expectations 
The restricted model under naive expectations behaves quite differently than the 
unrestricted model in terms of the response of the inflation to an inflation shock. In 
the first period, when the economy experiences an unanticipated and temporary 1-
percent decrease in inflation, in both models, inflation shows a sudden decrease and 
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then increases back. It finally stabilizes around zero in the unrestricted model, 
whereas in the restricted model under naive expectations, the inflation gradually 
increases yet does not stabilize at zero. Therefore, the performance of the naive 
model is very poor in terms of capturing the effect of an inflation shock. Even after 
40 lags, although, the responses of the unrestricted and the restricted model converge 
to each other, they do not completely coincide (See Figure A.5 in Appendix A).  
Like in period 1, the restricted model under naive expectations in period 2, 
behaves quite differently than the unrestricted model, in terms of the response of 
inflation to an inflation shock. Inflation shows a sudden decrease in both models 
when the economy experiences an unanticipated and temporary 1-percent decrease in 
inflation. In the unrestricted model, it starts to increase sharply after the shock and 
stabilizes around zero, whereas in the restricted model under naive expectations, 
inflation shows a very gradual increase, yet, converges to –1.7 instead of zero even 
40 periods after the shock was received. As far as capturing the effect of an inflation 
shock is concerned, the restricted model under naive expectations is far away in 
reaching this goal. The performance of the naive expectations is even poorer in 
period 2 than in period 1 such that the divergence of the impulse responses of 
inflation in two settings of model is even wider this time (See Figure A.6 in 
Appendix A). 
The restricted model under naive expectations has quite a different behavior 
than the unrestricted model as far as the response of output to an inflation shock is 
concerned. An unanticipated and temporary 1-percent decrease in inflation in the 
first period, results in output loss in both models. However, in the restricted model 
under naive expectations, there is a sharper decline in output, and a slower and a 
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less-than-full recovery, whereas, in the unrestricted model, the initial output loss due 
to inflation shock is less severe, and the economy starts to recover immediately and 
more rapidly. Again, the performance of the naive model is very poor in terms of 
capturing the effect of a shock to output. Even in the long run, the responses do not 
coincide although they converge to each other (See Figure A.7 in Appendix A).  
Similarly, the output from the restricted model under naive expectations 
responds to differently than the output in the unrestricted model to an inflation shock 
in the second period. Output decreases in both models when the economy 
experiences an unanticipated and temporary 1-percent decrease in inflation. In the 
unrestricted model, the economy starts to recover from the shock more rapidly and 
settles around zero about 20 months after the shock was received. However, in the 
restricted model under naive expectations, the economy continues to experience a 
gradual decrease in output, and the output shows only a slight recovery afterwards. 
Even after 40 months, the output is around –1.1 (See Figure A.8 in Appendix A).  
In terms of capturing the effect of an inflation shock on output, the restricted 
model of naive expectations performs weakly. Its performance is even worse in 
period 2 than in period 1 since there is even a wider gap between the impulse 
responses of output in the restricted model and the unrestricted model. Thus, naive 
expectations clearly fail to fit the data.  
2.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the inflation dynamics in Turkey, with special emphasis 
on how the expectations are formed. By ruling out rational expectations in the 
theoretical model, this study assesses carefully how the behavior of inflation in 
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Turkey can be explained assuming that agents are near rational. One alternative then 
is to assume that agents make optimal univariate forecasts of inflation and output. As 
another alternative to near rational behavior, the paper also analyzes how inflation 
and output behave, assuming that agents have naive expectations. For two different 
periods, the paper compares the performance of the sticky price model outlined in 
the theoretical setting first under the assumption that agents have optimal univariate 
expectations, and then alternatively, under the assumption that agents have naive 
expectations where the first period is the relatively lower period of inflation and the 
second period is the relatively higher inflation period. 
The empirical analysis shows that the model with optimal univariate 
expectations of inflation and output meet Lucas (1976) critique. In both periods, the 
model with optimal univariate expectations captures the effect of past inflation on 
current inflation, whereas, the model with naive expectations fails to capture this 
effect. Moreover, the analysis of impulse responses of inflation and output to a one-
unit shock in inflation reveals that the assumption of naive expectations is highly 
unrealistic given the poor performance of the model when compared to the 
unrestricted model. However, the model with optimal univariate expectations 
performs very well. In both periods, the impulse responses in the restricted model 
and the unrestricted model converge to each other very quickly. The model with 
naive expectations, on the other hand, performs even worse during a relatively higher 
inflation period. 
This paper assumed that agents deviate from rationality by ignoring other 
relevant variables such as interest rates or exchange rates in forming their 
expectations about inflation, and hence, the expectations are univariate. However, 
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these univariate expectations are optimal in the sense that agents use information 
about inflation as best as they can. Further work may elaborate on how these optimal 
expectations are formed. An alternative would be to select the best Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model. Another alternative would be to 
assume that agents are not identical, and the economy is a mixture of agents with 
fully rational and near rational behavior, the composition of which depends on the 
credibility and the transparency of the policymakers. In order to further complicate 
the model, other variables such as interest rates and exchange rates, and given the 
high burden of the budget deficit on the Turkish economy, fiscal side can be added, 
which further implies that expectations are multivariate.  
In a more realistic setting, the model should also include a policy rule. Then, 
the significance of expectation formation will be more apparent for the conduct of an 
efficient monetary policy depending on how well the policy rule takes into account 
of the expectations and how well these expectations can be modeled. Only then the 
choice of efficient monetary policy tools or targets can be provided. However, our 
parsimonious model still remains crucial, since, in its simplest form, the model 
succeeds in showing that agents are far away from being naive.  
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYZING THE PERSISTENCE OF  
CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION USING RATCHET VARIABLE:  
NEW EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Turkish policymakers commonly acknowledged exchange rate as a key policy 
instrument that played a crucial role in Turkish stabilization and adjustment 
programs. Latin American experience also proves that exchange rate policy is the 
key to the success or failure of such programs. Although, exchange rate issues in 
Southern Cone countries have been subjects of many researches, the experience of 
Turkey has not been sufficiently studied. The aim of this paper is therefore, to fill 
this gap in the literature. 
Currency substitution, also known as “dollarization”, is the situation in which 
a more stable foreign currency circulates, (perhaps illegally), along with the local 
currency. Although, most countries have a domestic currency of their own, many 
governments cannot persuade their citizens to hold only domestic currency without a 
legal restriction. Even in the presence of such restrictions however, foreign currency 
may substitute domestic currency, because, in today’s global economy, it is 
implausible to assume that no foreign currency is held in the domestic country such 
that companies have strong incentives to diversify their currency holdings in order to 
facilitate international business. Additionally, people who make purchases from 
foreign countries demand foreign currency for transaction purposes or people may 
hold currency to diversify their portfolios. 
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The class of currencies that substitutes domestic currencies is restricted to 
only a few. For example, it would be odd to see international transactions 
denominated in Turkish lira. Yet, it is very common to see US dollar denominated 
contracts in Turkey or in other countries. Actually, it is estimated that 180 billion US 
dollar or so may be circulating outside the United States.1 Sprenkle (1993) notes that 
the Federal Reserve is unable to account for as much as 80 percent of the US dollars 
held in currency. But, why is US dollar so popular? A currency functions as a 
medium of exchange, unit of account and a store of value. US dollar is popular as a 
store of value especially in countries where inflation erodes the value of the domestic 
currency. Due to the same reason, it is commonly used as a unit of account, and so it 
becomes convenient to use it globally as a medium of exchange. Therefore, today, 
the US dollar is the most popular vehicle currency- a currency used by non-residents 
in international transactions.2 
The earlier works on currency substitution in Turkey provide enough 
evidence on the existence of currency substitution in Turkey (Selçuk, 1994, 1997, 
2001; Akçay et al., 1997). Yet, these works do not provide information on whether 
currency substitution has reached an irreversible stage or not. Then, the question is to 
see, whether there is hysteresis in currency substitution in Turkey, and if so, model 
this hysteresis through the inclusion of a ratchet variable. By using alternative 
measures of currency substitution, the aim of this paper is to find out whether the 
economy at large has reached a point where currency substitution is costly to be 
reversed, and if so, to decide whether monetary policy may still be effective in 
altering this trend. 
                                                 
1
 This figure is taken from Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1994). 
2
 This definition is borrowed from Krugman (1980). 
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We proceed as follows: The following section gives the various definitions of 
currency substitution along with the theoretical as well as empirical models of 
currency substitution in the literature. An overview of the recent research on the 
currency substitution in the next section will be followed by a discussion on the 
earlier studies on currency substitution issue in Turkey. The next section discusses 
the modeling of the ratchet effects in currency substitution. To that aim, the section 
gives a brief note on ratchet variable and then outlines the econometric methodology 
by presenting the empirical currency substitution model as well as the description of 
the data and a detailed overview of the ADL approach to cointegration. Following 
section gives the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section concludes 
this paper. The output is provided in Appendix B. 
3.2. Currency Substitution in the Literature 
After the introduction in the previous section, this section will give a brief 
overview on the issue of currency substitution. First, the section will provide 
information on various definitions of currency substitution. Consequently, the section 
will discuss the reasons for currency substitution in different economies. Finally, the 
section will conclude by a survey of recent studies on currency substitution followed 
by an outline of studies on currency substitution in Turkey. 
3.2.1 Definitions of Currency Substitution 
The definition of currency substitution covers a wide array of possibilities, such as, 
foreign currency denominated deposits in the domestic financial system, deposits 
held abroad by domestic residents, and foreign currency circulating in the country. In 
other words, definition of the currency substitution varies like the definition of 
money, from narrow to broad. Because of these various definitions of currency 
substitution, economists have had difficulty in reaching on a consensus to choose the 
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precise one. Mizen and Pentecost (1996) define currency substitution simply as the 
substitution between two moneys. Cuddington (1983), and Calvo and Végh (1992) 
use the currency substitution to refer to the use of different currencies as the medium 
of exchange. For the transfer between domestic and foreign interest-bearing assets 
however, they prefer to use ”capital mobility”. Alternative definitions are 
“replacement of domestic currency in its traditional roles by foreign currencies”, by 
Selçuk (1994) or “the use of a stable foreign currency for transactions” by 
Sturzenegger (1997). 
Giovannini and Turtelboom (1992) distinguish between “currency 
substitution” and “currency substitutability”. According to them, the former is the 
case when domestic currency is completely replaced by foreign currency, i.e. good 
money drives out bad money. The latter, on the other hand, is the process by which 
one currency becomes a substitute for another, but does not completely replace it. 
Another distinction is by McKinnon (1982,1985), such that, there are two types of 
currency substitution: “direct” and “indirect”. Former is the case where two or more 
currencies compete as a means of payment within the same commodity domain, and 
the latter is the case when investors switch between non-monetary financial assets 
denominated in different currencies in a way that indirectly affects the domestic 
demand for transaction balances. 
The term “dollarization” has been used in the Latin American context when 
referring to currency substitution. As pointed out by Calvo and Végh (1992), 
however, one should distinguish between dollarization and currency substitution, 
such that, the use of the term “dollarization” is mostly to refer to the use of foreign 
currency as a unit of account or as a store of value. Yet, according to the definition 
by the above authors, currency substitution is the use of foreign currency as a 
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medium of exchange. Theoretically, currency substitution is the last stage of 
dollarization, and dollarization ratios like the ratio of foreign currency denominated 
deposits to broad money can only be a proxy for currency substitution since there are 
usually no data on foreign currency circulating in the economy. Therefore, it is useful 
to keep this distinction in mind. 
In addition to these different definitions of currency substitution, Krueger and 
Ha (1995) introduce yet another term “co-circulation” which, as defined by these 
authors, is the regular use of two or more currencies within a country. The co-
circulating currency can meet all the functions of the national currency as a medium 
of exchange, unit of account or as the store of value. So, co-circulation, according to 
the above authors, is a more specific case of currency substitution, since, it is the 
physical use of foreign currency within the domestic economy. Yet another 
definition is by Boyer (1996), such that, currency substitution can be categorized as 
“demand-side” and “supply-side” currency substitution. The demand-side currency 
substitution puts emphasis on how portfolio managers respond to opportunities given 
the possible differentials between domestic and international nominal rates of return. 
However, if the authorities operate under a fixed exchange rate regime, where they 
make the currencies perfect substitutes at a fixed price, then there is the supply-side 
currency substitution. Examples to this would be Bretton Woods agreement or Gold 
Standard during which monetary authorities were required to maintain the value of 
their currencies within a predetermined band. Today, similar arrangements are 
implemented in the European Union. 
Over the last decade, with the widespread use of flexible exchange rate 
system, the importance of supply-side currency substitution has been underestimated 
or even forgotten. However, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between 
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these two definitions of currency substitution. If the value of a currency changes, 
there may be very different explanations, depending on whether it is due to investors’ 
sentiment or due to a change in monetary policy. An exogenous increase in the 
money supply will have dissimilar consequences depending on the source of the 
exchange rate instability. As Boyer (1996) discusses, central bank is the main actor 
in the short term, but in the long run, portfolio managers are the main forces. This 
implies that a central bank wishing to have a credible rate sets the interest rate that is 
in line with the international rate. Therefore, the degree of correlation between the 
short term interest rate and the international rate is a measure of the amount of the 
supply-side currency substitution. 
3.2.2 Why is there Currency Substitution? 
Currency substitution happens in different countries for different reasons. For 
example, in North America, currency substitution is seen as the financial counterpart 
to cross border trade between the US and Canada also with Mexico. In Europe, 
currency substitution received attention after Delors Plan, the plan for a single 
market and also after the fall of Iron Curtain. In Eastern Europe and former Soviet 
Union, currency substitution is the outcome of high inflation, whereas in Western 
Europe, currency substitution is the result of the economic integration.  
In Latin American countries and in other developing countries, currency 
substitution is due to high inflation. In these countries, inflation tax seigniorage is 
very important as a means of raising revenue, and currency substitution erodes the 
tax base. The extent to which policymakers respond to currency substitution is 
crucial since as inflation rate increases, people switch to more stable currencies, 
therefore, inflation tax revenue decreases, as inflation gets higher. However, Mizen 
and Pentecost (1996), and also Sahay and Végh (1995) discuss that even after the fall 
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in inflation rate, people do not switch back to domestic currency so readily. 
Therefore currency substitution results in prolonged period of macroeconomic 
instability like it happened in Bolivia, Uruguay and Peru. These authors conclude 
that in any economy that is integrated with world capital markets, even when there 
are high real returns on domestic currency, some degree of dollarization is inevitable 
since people would like to diversify their portfolios. 
3.2.3 Earlier Studies on Currency Substitution 
Currency substitution has been extensively analyzed in the economic literature. Early 
models of currency substitution were developed for hyperinflation countries like 
Germany in the period 1921-23. After the collapse of Bretton Woods agreement, 
floating exchange rate regime in the early 1970s resulted in the deregulation of 
financial markets, spread of financial markets to new locations, emerging of many 
new financial instruments and trade liberalization. Globalization enabled the 
investors to diversify risk by holding different types of assets, denominated in 
different currencies, and in different locations. Currency substitution has once again 
become the focus of attention, this time, in order to answer the question of how or to 
what degree it should be taken care of by policymakers, since currency substitution 
creates domestic money demand instabilities, making monetary targeting far more 
difficult.  
Miles (1978) argues that currency substitution jeopardizes monetary 
independence across nations even with flexible exchange rate regime. Because 
monetary independence assumption under freely floating exchange rates is based on 
conventional money demand functions that fail to capture the possibility of a demand 
for foreign currency. So, therefore this type of money demand functions can be 
structurally unstable. As discussed by McKinnon (1982), larger countries whose 
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financial assets are significant and substitutable should coordinate their monetary 
policies in order to maintain stable money growth. Darrat et al. (1996) also 
emphasizes the importance of taking currency substitution into account for the proper 
conduct of monetary policy. 
Girton and Roper (1981) show that in a two-country model of the exchange 
rate where the path of the money is exogenous, the exchange rate between the two 
money is unstable, such that, movements in the exchange rate to maintain monetary 
equilibrium become larger without limit as currency substitution increases. The 
extreme case of perfect substitution implies that the exchange rate is going to be 
indeterminate.  
Miles (1978) also shows that the degree of currency substitution affects 
monetary policy as well as the real sector. He shows that when there is perfect 
substitution between two moneys, an increase in the money supply in one country 
will cause the supply of money in the other country to increase by exactly the same 
amount. Consequently, the inflation rate will be transmitted by the same amount. 
Therefore, currency substitution rules out that the countries are insulated under 
flexible exchange rate regime. 
Ortiz (1983) argues that, if the demand for money is influenced by foreign 
variables, then it is inevitable that the currency substitution will result in the 
transmission of instabilities from abroad, no matter how consistent the policies that 
are followed in the domestic country. Even in the less extreme cases, he finds that 
substantial monetary instability might arise as a result of the diversification of the 
currency holdings of the residents.  
Canzoneri and Diba (1992) show that in order to create inflation tax revenue, 
countries should adopt the same monetary growth when there is currency 
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substitution. Otherwise, the country should give up all possible revenues than can be 
raised from an inflation tax. So, in that sense, currency substitution as also discussed 
by Barnett and Ho (1996) provides an inflationary discipline. According to them, if 
private agents believe that the policymakers will not commit themselves to a fixed 
policy rule, then, they will substitute the domestic currency. But then, this will create 
volatility in the exchange rates, therefore, the authors suggest that economic policies 
should be coordinated within an international monetary system, to provide a 
commitment to a fixed money supply rule. 
Darrat et al. (1996) also emphasize the role of coordination among countries 
in order to reduce instability that is created by currency substitution. They find that, 
for the case of Japan, money demand function is stable only if it allows for the effect 
of currency substitution. So therefore, Japanese monetary authorities should consider 
the effects of currency substitution on money demand, and rather than conducting 
independent policies, the US and Japan should coordinate their monetary policies as 
a bloc.  
According to Girton and Roper (1981) in order to retain market shares, 
monetary authorities may cooperatively determine a joint monetary policy through a 
cartel agreement. To reduce the incentive for currency substitution, a formal cartel 
should be established, and this cartel should include a fixed exchange rate agreement 
to ensure that the member countries coordinate their policies. The authors also show 
that, when the behavior of the monetary authorities is endogenized, the instability 
associated with currency substitution is eliminated. 
In addition to these aforementioned effects of the currency substitution, 
foreign currency denominated deposits increase, but this causes the composition of 
banks’ portfolio to be altered, since, now that the domestic currency denominated 
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deposits are relatively less, the ability of banks to provide credit in domestic currency 
decrease. On the other hand, agents that are oriented to domestic markets may 
hesitate to borrow in foreign currency because of a fear of future devaluation and 
having less chance to hedge against foreign currency shocks. Therefore, currency 
substitution causes tightening in the credit market from the supply side, leading to 
overall inefficiency in the economy. 
As suggested by Thomas (1985), agents facing potential exchange rate risk 
can acquire offsetting liabilities in the same denomination. But, then, the question 
arises as to whether these liabilities are available and also riskless or not. He argues 
that offsetting liabilities constitute a perfect hedge only if the value of the liability 
does not change with changes in the interest rates then otherwise, the agent would 
have to bear interest rate risk even though he avoids exchange rate risk. 
3.2.4 Previous Studies on Currency Substitution in Turkey 
There are a few studies on the issue of currency substitution in Turkey. The first is by 
Selçuk (1994), where, using a VAR model consisting of a measure for currency 
substitution, domestic interest rate, and the expected depreciation rate, the author 
analyses the internal dynamics of currency substitution, with the objective to identify 
the responses of currency substitution, to shocks in certain policy variables in the 
Turkish economy, for the period 1986:1-1992:1. He assumes that no foreign currency 
was widely used as a unit of account or as a medium of exchange before the 
elimination of foreign currency controls. 
Selçuk (1994) estimates the VAR model with a constant term and the first 
differences of the variables with three variables. The lagged values of currency 
substitution have positive coefficients suggesting persistence. The impulse response 
functions show that an unexpected real appreciation of the Turkish lira has a negative 
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impact on the growth rate of currency substitution. Similarly, an unexpected increase 
in domestic nominal interest rates, though positive for the first month, has a negative 
impact on the growth rate of currency substitution after then. The study concludes 
that these results are in line with previous empirical studies on currency substitution 
in different countries.  
The impulse response of currency substitution and the estimated coefficients 
of trade weighted real exchange rate point out the danger of losing the ability to 
conduct an independent monetary policy. Therefore, policymakers have to trade off a 
less external deficit that can be achieved by depreciation which further results in 
currency substitution, with more independent monetary policy. The estimation results 
show that nominal interest rate on domestic assets is another significant variable in 
the currency substitution process. Decrease in nominal returns increases currency 
substitution, since domestic assets are now less attractive. 
Another study on currency substitution in the Turkish economy is again by 
the same author, Selçuk (1997). This study replicates an earlier study by mrohorolu 
(1994) on currency substitution between the Canadian dollar and the US dollar. 
mrohorolu (1994) proposes a dynamic approach in which money enters the agent’s 
utility function because it provides cost reducing services. This money-in-the-utility 
function model is estimated and tested using Hansen’s (1982) Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) procedure. The results show that elasticity of substitution between 
the Turkish lira and the US dollar is high, and statistically significant. The estimate 
of the share of foreign balances in producing domestic money services is 
considerably large and statistically significant. 
Akçay et al. (1997) estimate a money demand equation that also takes 
currency substitution into account by including a depreciation rate term into the set 
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of independent variables. This study differs from the others by obtaining an expected 
depreciation series using Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (E-GARCH) model unlike other studies that resort to proxying 
expected depreciation. The authors conclude that the significantly negative 
coefficient of the depreciation rate is suggestive of dollarization in the estimation 
period, and they also find that as dollarization increases, so does the volatility of the 
exchange rate. 
A final study is by Selçuk (2001), where the effect of currency substitution is 
analyzed on the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate in Turkey. The author 
estimates a money-in-the-utility function model, where he shows that the seigniorage 
maximizing inflation rate in Turkey cannot deviate from the world inflation rate due 
to the high elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign currencies. He 
compares this result to conventional money demand estimation, and the he finds that 
the conventional estimate of seigniorage maximizing inflation rate in Turkey is 
several times higher than the world inflation rate. However, this result is misleading, 
since it ignores the possibility of currency substitution.  
He concludes that as long as there is some degree of currency substitution in 
the economy, the government cannot collect more seigniorage revenue by simply 
setting the growth rate of monetary base at a higher level. If foreign real balances 
produce some liquidity service in the economy, the seigniorage maximizing inflation 
rate in Turkey cannot deviate from the world inflation. He also finds that, so long as 
the domestic inflation is higher than the world inflation and there is some degree of 
currency substitution, the Turkish economy is always on the wrong side of the 
seigniorage-Laffer curve. This finding has some important policy implications such 
that, if a stabilization program is implemented vigorously, so that the steady state 
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level of inflation is closer to the world inflation, it is very likely that that the real 
seigniorage revenue will increase significantly. 
3.3 Models of Currency Substitution 
Models of currency substitution can be classified as Theoretical Models of Currency 
Substitution and Empirical Models of Currency Substitution. This needs a further 
classification, such that, the theoretical models of currency substitution can be 
categorized as Cash-in-Advance models, Transactions Costs models, and Ad-Hoc 
models. The empirical models of currency substitution can be categorized as: The 
Unrestricted Portfolio Balance Models, Restricted Portfolio Balance Models, and 
finally the Dynamic Models. 
3.3.1 Theoretical Models of Currency Substitution 
The theoretical models of currency substitution are simply an extension of money 
demand models to multi-currency case. They can be classified into three categories: 
Cash-in-Advance models, Transactions-Costs models, and Ad-Hoc models where, 
the nature of the substitutability of different currencies is specified a priori. In cash-
in-advance models, agents maximize utility subject to the cash-in-advance constraint 
such that  
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Where, M/P and M*/P* are domestic and foreign real balances, and C and C* 
are domestic and foreign cash in hand. The relative price of two goods is determined 
by goods market equilibrium. The first order condition of the maximization problem 
gives us the following: 
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Where, subscripts show the partial derivatives of the utility function U with 
respect to C and C*, and e is the nominal exchange rate. If the utility function is 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES), with σ showing the degree of elasticity of 
substitution, the first order condition combined with the cash-in-advance constraint 
gives the following expression for exchange rate: 
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Although, cash-in-advance constraint itself does not allow for substitution 
between two currencies, substitutability is still possible by the utility function. 
According to the above equation, as two goods become more substitutable, i.e. as the 
elasticity of substitution increases as shown by the increase in σ, the volatility of the 
exchange rate in response to exogenous shocks increases.  
Suppose we change the cash-in-advance constraint to allow for currency 
substitution, such that, it is now possible to buy either goods with either currency. In 
that case, the constraint can be written as: 
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The above specification of the cash-in-advance constraint results in multiple 
equilibria, which highlight the potential instabilities caused by currency substitution. 
This model is not realistic in the sense that, agents carry cash only for transactions, 
and, money does not serve as a store of value, so therefore, agents do not have idle 
cash in their portfolios. However, empirical evidence suggests that money has an 
important role as a store of value. 
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Transactions costs model is based on this empirical evidence about the 
function of money as a store of value, and relates this fact to the transaction costs 
incurred in converting other assets into goods or money. Because of these costs, 
agents cannot instantaneously acquire cash, and hence, money is more liquid than 
any other asset. 
In this model, a representative agent solves the following maximization 
problem: 
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(3.7) 
Where, y and y* are the endowments of two goods, B and B* are the domestic 
and foreign bonds, and φ is the transactions costs function. φ is increasing in C and 
C*, and decreasing in the stocks of real money balances. Z and Z* are exogenous 
transfers of domestic and foreign cash balances. Solving for the first order conditions 
and imposing specific functional form on the transactions costs function φ, one can 
solve for the demand for domestic and foreign money.  
The model implies that individuals choose between money and other assets, 
by comparing the expected returns on these assets. Also, this model emphasizes the 
role of financial markets as being one of the determinants of the demand for money, 
such that, as money becomes more liquid compared to other assets due to 
 61
underdeveloped financial markets, the demand for money increases due to its store of 
value. In a high inflation economy, the demand for foreign currency increases.  
3.3.2 Empirical Models of Currency Substitution 
The empirical models of currency substitution can be divided into three main 
categories: Restricted Portfolio Balance Models, Unrestricted Portfolio Balance 
Models, and finally the Dynamic Models. In the restricted portfolio balance model, 
agents allocate their wealth among available assets in two stages. In the first stage, 
the portfolio is divided between money and bonds. In the second stage, portfolio of 
money is divided between foreign and domestic money, and foreign and domestic 
bonds. It is assumed that these portfolios are independent of each other, and we need 
only to consider the allocation of the money portfolio between domestic and foreign 
cash balances. In the unrestricted portfolio balance model, all assets are available to 
investors, and agents choose a combination of assets that maximize the return of the 
portfolio subject to a minimal level of risk. In the dynamic model, agents derive 
instantaneous utility from consumption and from money services where money 
services are produced by using a combination of domestic and foreign real balances 
in a CES production function. 
Restricted Portfolio Balance Model 
In the restricted portfolio balance model, Miles (1978) assume that agents 
maximize the CES type of function S, which produces money services, subject to the 
budget constraint.  
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The consumer’s optimization problem can be written as 
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Where, Mo is the desired level of money services fixed at the initial stage of 
the portfolio maximization problem. Assuming that law-of-one-price holds, the first 
order conditions yield the following equation: 
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ρσ += 1/1  (3.11) 
Where, σ, the degree of currency substitution, is determined by estimating 
equation (3.10). 
Unrestricted Portfolio Balance Model 
Girton and Roper (1981) and Cuddington (1983) assume that agents can hold 
four assets, and switch between them simultaneously in the unrestricted portfolio 
balance model. The demand equations for these four assets are: 
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Where, x is the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, r is the 
domestic interest rate, r* is the foreign interest rate, and r*+x is the rate of return on 
foreign bonds that matters for the domestic investors. In empirical studies, to test 
currency substitution, the above equations can be approximated in log-linear form: 
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Where, the degree of currency substitution is measured by the parameter α4, 
γ3 and δ3 measure the substitution between bonds, which is “indirect currency 
substitution” as named by McKinnon. γ4 and β2 measure the degree of substitution 
between money denominated in one currency and bonds denominated in the other 
currency. The model, by including both x and r*+x, allows one to distinguish 
between capital mobility and currency substitution. 
Dynamic Models 
mrohorolu (1991) develops a model, where, a representative agent derives 
instantaneous utility from consumption and from money services. Money services 
are produced by using a combination of domestic and foreign real balances in a CES 
production function such that   
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Where, 0 < α < 1, -1 < ρ < ∞, and ρ is different than 0 and γ >0. The 
representative domestic resident maximizes the expected discounted sum of the 
period utility function such that, the consumer’s maximization problem is to: 
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Where, β is the discount factor, ct is the per capita consumption, rt is the real 
returns on bonds, that are purchased in period t. mt /pt and mt*/pt* are the domestic 
and foreign real balances in period t, and finally, each individual receives an 
exogenous endowment yt, which is subject to a lump-sum tax of τt 
Assume that the utility function is separable in consumption, ct, and liquidity 
services, xt, and linear in consumption such that 
tt xctU +=)(  (3.23) 
The first order conditions give the following Euler equations: 
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Imposing purchasing power parity, et=pt/pt*, the estimation equations, now, 
are: 
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Where, d1,t+1, d2,t+1 and d3,t+1 are the corresponding error terms in the Euler 
equations.
 
Using Hansen’s (1982) GMM procedure, the estimates of the parameters in 
the above equations are obtained such, and the instrument set is as below: 
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Let dt+1= (d1,t+1 d2,t+1  d3,,t+1 )′ and zt be  the vector of instruments. Then, the 
following function can be formed using sample information  
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Where, θ = (α, β, γ, ρ)′. The parameter vector can be estimated by 
minimizing gT(θ)′WT g(θ) and WT  is a symmetric, positive definite weighting matrix. 
The parameter estimates are consistent, efficient and asymptotically normal. 
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3.4 Modeling Ratchet Effects in Currency Substitution 
The earlier work on currency substitution in Turkey as well as the evolution of some 
of the macroeconomic variables provide evidence on the existence of currency 
substitution in Turkey (See Figures 3.1-3.2). However, we do not have sufficient 
information on whether currency substitution has reached an irreversible stage or not. 
Therefore, the question is to see whether there is hysteresis in currency substitution 
in Turkey, and if so, model this hysteresis through the inclusion of a ratchet variable.  
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Figure 3.1. The evolution of some macroeconomic variables, Period 1: 1990-1993 
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Figure 3.2. The evolution of some macroeconomic variables, Period 2: 1995-1999 
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3.4.1 Some Notes on Ratchet Variable 
In economic models that include a ratchet variable, it is assumed that, the dependent 
variable reacts asymmetrically to changes in one of the key explanatory variables. 
The common practice is to model this ratchet effect through the inclusion of the past 
peak value of an independent variable in addition to the current value of that variable 
or of the past peak value of one of the dependent variables.3 
The existence of an asymmetry in currency substitution is attributed to the 
fixed costs of developing, learning and applying new money management techniques 
to beat inflation. Once these fixed costs are paid for, there are a few incentives to 
switch back to domestic currency after the end of the period of instability, thus 
causing a ratchet effect on the demand for domestic and foreign currency even if 
macroeconomic stabilization is achieved. 4  
The credibility of the policymakers in these stabilization programs may 
shorten or prolong the duration of the ratchet effect as well as its influence. Only a 
significant decline in inflation or a considerable appreciation of the currency can 
overcome the sunk cost of finding strategies to beat inflation and provide enough 
incentives to revert back to traditional domestic money balances.  
3.4.2 Econometric Methodology 
After the brief overview on ratchet variables in the previous section, this section 
outlines the empirical currency substitution model that captures the ratchet effect. 
The econometric model adopted in this study lies on a simple structural model based 
on a standard money demand function that incorporates interest rate differential and 
                                                 
3
 See the previous models that include ratchet variable, by Enzler et al. (1976), Simpson and Porter 
(1980), Piterman (1988), Kamin and Ericsson (1993). 
4
 See Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989), Dornbusch et al. (1990), Sturzenegger (1992), and Guidotti and Rodriguez 
(1991). 
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depreciation. Following Mongardini and Mueller (1999, 2000), the currency 
substitution model that is adopted is the following: 
ttLtLtLtt uRatchetExchIntDiffCSCS +++++= −−−− 3211 βββα  (3.34) 
Where, CS is a measure of currency substitution, IntDiff is the interest rate 
differential between domestic and foreign assets, and Exch is the percentage change 
in the exchange rate and Ratchet is the variable that denotes the persistence effect in 
the currency substitution, and clearly ut is the error term. 
3.4.3 Description of the Data 
After the introduction on the empirical model in the previous part, this section will 
provide detailed information about the data set, and the next section will present the 
results of the empirical analysis of this paper. The data that are used are publicly 
available from the data set of the CBRT. The data set covers the periods from 1990 
to 1993, and from 1995 to 1999. The frequency of the data is monthly. 
The notation that is adopted is as follows: CS is a measure of currency 
substitution, IntDiff is the interest rate differential between Turkish lira denominated 
time deposits and foreign exchange denominated time deposits.5 Exch is the 
differenced logged nominal depreciation of the Turkish lira against the basket 
exchange rate, which is composed of 1 US dollar+1.5 DM.6 IntDiff1 measures the 
differential between TL denominated 1-month time deposit and foreign exchange 
denominated 1-month time deposit. The returns on 1-month foreign exchange deposit 
                                                 
5
 Mongardini and Mueller (1999, 2000) take the difference between the average monthly yield on 3-
month Kyrgyz T-bills and the average monthly yield on 3-month US T-bills. However, this 
differential rather than measuring the degree of sensitivity of currency substitution with respect to 
interest rate differential; measures the degree of sensitivity of asset substitution with respect to the 
interest rate differential. Therefore, the difference between the interest rate on TL denominated time 
deposits and interest rate on foreign exchange denominated time deposits in the domestic market is 
taken as the interest rate differential. 
6
 40 percent of Turkey’s international trade is US dollar denominated and the rest is German Mark 
denominated. Therefore, this basket exchange rate is a simplified trade weighted exchange rate.  
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is a weighted average of the return on US dollar denominated deposits and German 
Mark denominated deposits, where, weights are assigned according to the weights of 
the basket exchange rate. The interest rates are nominal.  
In order to distinguish between different degrees of currency substitution to 
see whether Ratchet effect becomes more significant or not as one goes from narrow 
to broader definitions of money, CS has alternative sets of definitions. More 
specifically, CS is defined as the logarithm of foreign exchange denominated 
deposits/M1 in the narrow sense or foreign exchange denominated deposits/total 
deposits, in the broad sense. Then, apparently, CS1 is foreign exchange denominated 
deposits/M1, and CSd is foreign exchange denominated deposits/total deposits.7 The 
ratchet variable is denoted by Rinf, the past peak value of the inflation rate. 
Alternatively, the past peak value of the depreciation rate is used as a ratchet 
variable, and this variable is denoted by Re. All the series are seasonally adjusted.8 
The period of analysis starts from 1990 and ends in 1999. However, the crisis 
year of 1994 is commented out in order to be able to compare the pre-crisis and post-
crisis periods in terms of the degree of persistence of currency substitution, and in 
order to find out at which level of monetary aggregation this persistence is more 
apparent. Also, the year 2000 and onward is excluded because the Central Bank of 
                                                 
7
 Different authors use different definitions to measure currency substitution. Yet, there is a consensus 
on using foreign exchange denominated deposits as a proxy to the demand for foreign money. Selçuk 
(1997) uses M2 in the denominator, whereas, van Aarle and Budina (1995) use M0 and M1. 
Mongardini and Mueller (1999, 2000) use total deposits in the denominator. The aim of using 
different definitions of currency substitution is to see at which level of monetary aggregation currency 
substitution is more significant. The circulation of foreign currency in the domestic economy should 
be used as the true value of the foreign money demand. However, this figure is not available for the 
Turkish economy. In its broadest sense, currency substitution should be measured by the ratio of the 
foreign exchange deposits to M2Y. However, then one should also be careful to distinguish between 
currency substitution and capital flight as M2Y also consists interest bearing monetary assets. 
8
 For seasonal adjustment, the above series are regressed on 12 monthly dummies without including a 
constant term. All the monthly dummies are significant and the residuals from these regressions are 
used as the seasonally adjusted series. 
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the Republic of Turkey started to implement the Disinflation Program as of the 
beginning of the year 2000. However, the program was halted as a result of the 
financial crises in November 2000 and in February 2001. So, adequate data for the 
analysis of currency substitution after the implementation of the Disinflation 
Program do not exist. Therefore, this paper analyzes two sub-periods where the first 
one covers the period from 1990 to 1993, and the second period is from 1995 till 
1999.  
3.4.4 The ADL Approach To Cointegration 
Before starting our econometric procedure, we test for the stationarity properties of 
our series. Tables 3.1-3.4 show the results of the Augmented-Dickey Fuller unit root 
tests for each series described above. Tables 3.1-3.4 indicate that all series are non-
stationary. Following Mongardini and Mueller (1999, 2000), a good approach is to 
apply autoregressive distributed lag procedure as outlined by Pesaran and Shin 
(1995). This approach is for the analysis of long run relations when the underlying 
variables are integrated of order 1. 
Table 3.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller Test at lag 12, including an intercept but not a 
linear trend, Period 1: 1990-1993 
 CS1 CSd Exch IntDiff1 Rinf Re R1 Rd 
ADF -2.52 -2.57 -1.46 -3.37 -0.62 -3.99 -2.38 -2.08 
ADF* -2.95 -2.95 -2.95 -2.95 -2.95 -2.95 -2.95 -2.95 
Table 3.2. Augmented Dickey Fuller Test at lag 12, including an intercept but not a 
linear trend, Period 2: 1995-1999 
CS1 CSd Exch IntDiff1 Rinf Re R1 Rd 
ADF -0.52 -0.11 -1.40 -1.82 -1.60 -1.41 -0.32 -0.51 
ADF* -2.92 -2.92 -2.93 -2.92 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 
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Table 3.3. Augmented Dickey Fuller Test at lag 12, including an intercept and a 
linear trend, Period 1: 1990-1993 
CS1 CSd Exch IntDiff1 Rinf Re R1 Rd 
ADF -2.30 -3.42 -1.46 -2.46 -2.38 -4.54 -1.79 -1.53 
ADF* -3.54 -3.54 -3.55 -3.54 -3.55 -3.55 -3.55 -3.55 
Table 3.4. Augmented Dickey Fuller Test at lag 12, including an intercept and a 
linear trend, Period 2: 1995-1999 
CS1 CSd Exch IntDiff1 Rinf Re R1 Rd 
ADF -2.75 -0.45 -2.23 -2.45 -0.60 -1.43 -1.81 -2.22 
ADF* -3.51 -3.51 -3.51 -3.51 -3.51 -3.51 -3.51 -3.51 
*95 percent critical value for the Augmented-Dickey Fuller Unit Root Test 
According to Pesaran and Shin (1995), using this approach after appropriate 
augmentation of the order of the ADL model, the OLS estimators of the short run 
parameters are consistent with the asymptotically singular covariance matrix. The 
ADL-based estimators of the long run coefficients are super-consistent, and valid 
inferences on the long run parameters can be made using standard normal asymptotic 
theory. 
The authors also analyze the relationship between the ADL procedure and the 
fully modified OLS approach of Phillips and Hansen to estimation of cointegrating 
relations. They also compare the small sample performance of these two approaches 
via Monte Carlo experiments. These results provide strong evidence in favor of the 
traditional ADL approach. This approach also has the additional advantage of 
producing consistent estimates of the long run coefficients that are asymptotically 
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normal regardless of whether the underlying independent variables are integrated or 
order 1 or zero.9  
3.5 The Estimation Results 
After this brief overview on the ADL approach in the previous part, this section will 
proceed by testing the persistence of currency substitution under alternative 
measures. Using the ADL approach outlined above, the analysis starts by first 
including the ratchet variable and then in the next step, this variable is excluded. 
Column (A) in the Tables B.1-B.12 in the Appendix B corresponds to the estimation 
results when the ratchet variable is included. Accordingly, Column (B) in the Tables 
B.1-B.12 in the Appendix B corresponds to the estimation results when the ratchet 
variable is excluded. For each definition of currency substitution, the error correction 
term, ecm is found according to equation (3.34). More specifically, the lagged error 
term from the regression of CS on the right hand side terms in equation (3.34) is 
plugged into the following equation, where L, the lag number, is set according to 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), such that:  
13211 int −−−−−− +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆
=∆
tLtLtLtLt
t
ecmRatchetExchdiffCS
CS
βββα  (3.35) 
Again, the optimal lag length for each variable is determined according to the 
Akaike information criterion. The estimation of the first equation gives us the 
“static” foreign money demand, whereas, the estimation of equation (3.35), when the 
                                                 
9
 More specifically, consider the following general ADL (p,q) model: 
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Where, xt is the k-dimensional I(1) variables that are not cointegrated among themselves, ut 
and t are serially uncorrelated disturbances with zero means and constant variance-covariances, and Pi 
are kxk coefficient matrices such that the vector autoregressive process in  xt is stable. 
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variables are in differenced forms, and with the inclusion of the lagged error term, is 
a dynamic version of the static foreign money demand.  
The parameter estimate of this lagged error term provides information about 
the adjustment speed of foreign money towards equilibrium. The reason to 
distinguish between static and dynamic foreign money demand function is important 
since this method allows us to differentiate between short term and long term 
behavior of foreign money demand. This distinction is crucial given that Turkey is in 
out of equilibrium phase.10 
3.5.1 The Analysis Using CS as the Ratchet Variable, Period 1: 1990-1993 
Using CS1 as the dependent variable, the regression produces mostly 
insignificant short run coefficients with the inclusion of the ratchet variable. By the 
exclusion of the ratchet variable, most of the short run coefficients are insignificant 
including the error correction term. With the inclusion of the ratchet variable, the 
only significant long run coefficient turns out to be the ratchet variable with a 
positive sign. This indicates that as the past peak value of CS1 increases, the current 
CS1 increases in the long run. The exclusion of the ratchet variable on the other hand 
produces insignificant long run coefficients (See Tables B.1-B.2 in Appendix B). 
CSd as the measure of currency substitution produces significant short run 
coefficients with or without the ratchet variable. By excluding the ratchet variable, 
the significance of the change in the depreciation rate and the interest rate differential 
increases. However the long run estimates of the coefficients with the exclusion of 
the ratchet variable are of the wrong sign, though they are significant. The long run 
estimation of the coefficients with the inclusion of the ratchet variable produces 
                                                 
10
 The estimation of equation (3.34) and equation (3.35) including a constant is subject to 
multicollinearity problem because of the ratchet variables. Therefore, none of the regressions include 
a constant. 
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insignificant depreciation rate coefficient, however the long run coefficient on the 
ratchet variable is significant (See Tables B.1-B.2 in Appendix B). 
3.5.2 The Analysis Using CS as the Ratchet Variable, Period 2: 1995-1999 
Using CS1 as the dependent variable, the regression results show that including 
ratchet variable produces mostly significant short run coefficients. However, the 
coefficient of the change in the depreciation rate of Turkish lira against the basket is 
of the wrong sign. The short run coefficient of the change in intdiff1 is significant, 
however mostly with positive sign. This indicates that as the gap between the rates 
on TL denominated 1-month time deposits and the foreign exchange denominated 1-
month time deposits increased, demand for foreign exchange increases. Normally, 
we would have expected this relationship to be negative. However this positive 
relationship between interest rate differential and the demand for foreign exchange 
suggests that the high leveling of interest rate and its further increase shifted the 
domestic portfolio allocations towards foreign denominated assets even more due to 
the increase in risk premium. Therefore, we see a positive relationship between 
interest rate differential and the demand for foreign exchange in the short run. 
However, in the long run, with or without ratchet variable, we see a negative 
relationship between the interest rate differential and the demand for foreign 
exchange i.e. as the return on TL denominated assets increase people switch from 
foreign exchange denominated assets to TL denominated assets. With the inclusion 
of the ratchet variable, all the long run coefficients turn out to be both significant and 
of the correct sign, with the inclusion of the ratchet variable. The exclusion of the 
ratchet variable on the other hand produces significant long run coefficients with the 
interest rate differential having positive sign. The inclusion of the ratchet variable 
produces a higher semi-elasticity of the demand for foreign exchange with respect to 
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interest rate. On the other hand, without the ratchet variable, the elasticity of the 
demand for foreign exchange with respect to the depreciation rate gets higher (See 
Tables B.3-B.4 in Appendix B). 
CSd as the measure of currency substitution produces mostly insignificant 
coefficients in the short run with the inclusion of the ratchet variable. The exclusion 
of the ratchet variable on the other hand produces significant short run coefficients of 
the correct sign. The long run estimates of the coefficients, without the ratchet 
variable yields only a significant depreciation rate. Both the depreciation rate and the 
ratchet variable turn out to be significant with the inclusion of the ratchet variable 
(See Tables B.3-B.4 in Appendix B).  
3.5.3 The Analysis Using Alternative Ratchet Variables, Period 1: 1990-1993 
Tables B.5-B.6 in Appendix B suggest that as one goes from a narrower definition of 
currency substitution to a broader one, the significance of the ratchet variable, Re, 
where the past peak value of the nominal depreciation rate, increases. This is true 
both in the long run and in the short run. 
Using the past peak value of the inflation rate as a ratchet variable, Rinf, 
almost all the short run coefficient estimates are significant in all alternative 
definitions of currency substitution. However, the significance of the long run 
coefficient estimates decreases as one goes from narrower to a broader definition of 
currency substitution. The inclusion of more lagged values of Rinf when compared to 
the case of Re suggests a more significant effect of the inflation rate on the 
determination of the persistence of currency substitution (See Tables B.7-B.8 in 
Appendix B).  
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3.5.4 The Analysis Using Alternative Ratchet Variables, Period 2: 1995-1999 
Tables B.9-B.10 in Appendix B suggest that, unlike the first period, in the second 
period, as one goes from a narrower definition of currency substitution to a broader 
one, the significance of the ratchet variable, Re decreases. This holds true both in the 
long run and in the short- run. Using CS1, most of the lagged differenced Re terms 
are significant with positive sign in the short run. However, the long run coefficient 
estimate of the Re is insignificant suggesting that Re is not significant in the long 
run. In cases where the broader definitions of currency substitution are used, the Re 
variable is not significant in both short run and in the long run estimations. 
Like Re, Rinf becomes more significant as a narrower currency substitution 
definition is used. This is true both in the short run and in the long run. But unlike 
Re, Rinf still produces some significant short run coefficient estimates even when the 
broadest definition of currency substitution is used. When compared to Re, one can 
conclude that Rinf has a more persistent effect on the currency substitution since 
Rinf variable appears in greater lags than Re in the short run estimations (See Tables 
B.11-B.12 in Appendix B).  
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyzes the persistence in currency substitution in two sub-periods, 
1990-1993 and 1995-1999. The aim is to see whether the currency substitution 
becomes more persistent at higher levels of inflation. Alternative ratchet variables 
are used in the analyses in order to learn more about the source of the persistence. 
More specifically, Re, the past peak value of the depreciation rate measures the 
impact of the depreciation of the domestic currency on the persistence of the 
currency substitution, whereas, Rinf measures the sensitivity of the persistence of the 
currency substitution with respect to inflation rate. 
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The results show that in both periods, the inflation rate has a more significant 
role in determining the persistence of the currency substitution at a narrower level. 
However, in the first period, the depreciation rate of the domestic currency becomes 
more significant at broader levels, whereas, in the second period, the depreciation 
rate is more significant at a narrower level. Therefore, one can conclude that, in both 
periods, inflation has a crucial role in determining the persistence of the currency 
substitution. The inflation rate, though of a diminishing magnitude, has significance 
in the determination of the currency substitution persistence, as one goes from 
narrower to broader measure of currency substitution 
On the other hand, depreciation of the domestic currency, though more 
significant initially, becomes significant in the currency substitution in the narrow 
sense later on. Therefore, in the second period, one cannot extend the depreciation 
rate based persistence to all levels of currency substitution. These results suggest 
that, even though, the persistence in the currency substitution may have been 
depreciation or inflation driven initially, both of these variables had a less significant 
impact on the persistence of currency substitution later on. Consequently, one cannot 
totally attribute the reason for the currency substitution persistence to the high levels 
of inflation or the depreciation of the domestic currency.  
This paper also analyzes the persistence in currency substitution by including 
the past peak value of the currency substitution measure into the analysis. The 
regression results show that, in the first period, for both levels of currency 
substitution, the inclusion of the ratchet variable into the model produces 
insignificant coefficients. Therefore, this result suggests that in the first period, 
currency substitution is not persistent enough to be irreversible. However, in the 
second period, currency substitution in the narrow sense produces significant 
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coefficients for the ratchet variable. Yet, the same conclusion cannot be reached for 
the currency substitution in the broader sense.  
The empirical evidence and econometric results show that while there may be 
a ratchet effect in the narrow sense currency substitution, this effect is not detectable 
in the overall economy, i.e., the portfolio allocation preferences of domestic residents 
are not persistent. The monetary authorities can therefore conduct effective policies 
to induce reversal in the narrow sense currency substitution. Nevertheless, one 
should be careful about the implications of these results. The conclusion about 
currency substitution not being subject to a ratchet effect should not be misleading as 
these results are based on figures of foreign currency deposits. Clearly, the currency 
substitution measure should also include foreign currency in circulation. However, 
such data are not available. Therefore, this study is incomplete. Yet, the scope of this 
paper is not finding such data or a proxy. For further research, however, one should 
find a more accurate measure of currency substitution, and repeat this exercise using 
this new measure. Only then can one conclude whether there is room for monetary 
policy to be effective or not. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN TURKEY 
UNDER THE MONETARY CONDITIONS INDEX:  
AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY RULE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Central Banks have only limited information about the structural relationships in the 
economy, and consequently, they have imperfect control over prices and ultimate 
target variables such as the inflation target. In order to assess the current economic 
condition, therefore, central banks need leading indicators, variables that contain 
information on the future path of the target variables. They also need policy 
indicators- variables for the assessment of the impact of a prospective monetary 
policy. 
Two monetary policy indicators that have received a vast amount of attention 
are the Taylor interest rate and the MCI, the Monetary Conditions Index. Taylor 
(1993) shows that the short term interest rate is a function of the inflationary 
developments and cyclical changes in the economy. Hence, the author formulates the 
“Taylor rule” according to which, the Central Bank raises interest rate if inflation and 
output exceed the targeted values, and similarly, Central Bank lowers interest rate if 
inflation and output are below the targeted values. 
The Monetary Conditions Index, on the other hand, is an index combined by 
the changes in the short term real interest rate and in the real effective exchange rate. 
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The purpose of constructing such an index is to take account of the role of both of the 
variables- the interest rate and the exchange rate- in the conduct of monetary policy, 
and hence, the monetary policy transmission process. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, a comparative analysis of 
the Taylor interest rate and the MCI is presented. The following section describes a 
theoretical MCI model. The next section gives the key equations of the structural 
model and discusses the underlying factors determining the model dynamics. The 
following section is simulations where the impulse responses of the economy to 
various shocks as well as the output-inflation variance frontier of the economy are 
analyzed. Finally, the last section concludes this paper. All the data are presented in 
Appendix C.  
4.2. A Quick Glance at the Taylor Rule and the MCI 
Taylor (1993) defines a policy rule as “ a contingency plan that lasts forever unless 
there is an explicit cancellation clause “. He states that among the many alternatives, 
there exists consensus on the performance of only some of the policy rules. For 
example, measured in output and price variability, as discussed by the author, the 
policy rules that focus on the exchange rate or money supply do not show a good 
performance as much as policies that focus on the price level and real output directly. 
In other words, monetary policy rules perform well if the rule states that an excessive 
price rise and an overutilisation of production capacity should be counteracted by a 
higher short term interest rate and vice versa. Accordingly, Taylor (1993) proposes a 
representative policy rule such that 
)(5.0)(5.0 ** yyi −+−+= pipiα  (4.1) 
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Where, i is the short term nominal interest rate, (–*) is the gap between 
actual inflation rate and the inflation target, and similarly (y–y*) is the gap between 
actual output and the potential output. When both inflation and output are at their 
steady state values, the interest rate also reaches its long run equilibrium value, . By 
assigning equal weights of 0.5 to (–*) and (y–y*), the author thus gives equal 
significance to both economic growth and maintaining price stability in the conduct 
of monetary policy. Taylor (1993) finally concludes that the above rule has 
empirically good performance across G-7 countries, and is also robust to structural 
changes. 
Despite its simplicity, using Taylor rule as a policy rule raises some theoretical 
as well as empirical problems. First of all, the equal weights assigned to the inflation 
gap and the output gap, (–*) and (y–y*), may not truly describe the structure of 
every economy. Therefore, these coefficients should in fact be econometrically 
estimated.1 Furthermore, the choice of the price index significantly alters the result 
when calculating the inflation rate, since, even though price indices may follow a 
similar path in most cases, they may also behave quite differently in some other 
cases, especially due to excessive exchange rate movements. Another practical issue 
is raised by the calculation of the output gap, which, depending on the method for 
calculating the potential output, may produce quite drastic differences.2  
                                                          
1
  Kesriyeli and Yalçın (1998) econometrically test the Taylor rule for Turkey for the period 1987-
1998. The authors, by using Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), find the coefficient of the output gap 
and the inflation gap in the monetary policy reaction function for Turkey to be equal to 6.92 and 0.8, 
respectively. Given the remarkably higher magnitudes of the coefficients than suggested by the Taylor 
rule, the authors conclude that Taylor rule does not perform well in economies like Turkey where high 
and persistent inflation with unstable economic growth is dominant. 
2
  The common methods for calculating potential output are by log-linear transformation of output 
level, or using a filtered output series such as Hodrick-Prescott or by simply estimating a production 
function. However, all the above methods may produce major differences, which are then reflected 
directly to the level and the behavior of the Taylor interest rate. 
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The assumption of constant long run equilibrium value for the interest rate is 
another weakness of the Taylor rule. As the economy changes so does the long run 
equilibrium value of the interest rate. In other words, as the factors affecting the 
interest rates like credibility of the central bank or the uncertainty pertaining to the 
economy or returns on other assets change, the interest rate may settle at a different 
plateau. Hence, the assumption of “constant long run equilibrium value for the 
interest rate” is invalidated. 
Another shortcoming of the standard Taylor rule is rather than taking into 
account of the outlook for the prices, it only considers the effect of the current 
inflation on interest rates. However, neglecting the role of the future prices in the 
policy rule only leads to systematic delays in the transmission of the effects of the 
current monetary policy decisions. Furthermore, adding relevant information like 
future prices to the Taylor rule will improve the effectiveness of the monetary policy. 
Finally, the Taylor rule also lacks the ability to differentiate once-and-for-all 
changes in the output level or in the inflation rate from more permanent changes. In 
either case, it calls for a need to change the level of the interest rate, where in fact, 
the economy could have stabilized by itself. In order to alleviate the adverse effects 
of such misdirection therefore, the policymakers should either analyze the individual 
determinants of the price level changes or base their inflation measure on “core 
inflation rate” instead of the CPI inflation.3 
Even though, as a near-rule-of-thumb, many researchers incorporate Taylor 
rule into their models, some have advocated the use of alternative rules (Svensson, 
1999, 2000; Ball, 1997, 1999, 2000a; Batini and Haldane, 1998; Markovic, 2001, 
                                                          
3
  Core inflation is assumed to filter out the transitory changes in prices. 
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Clarida et. al.,1997; Clarida and Gertler, 1996). One such alternative is the use of the 
MCI, which includes the effect of the exchange rate movements on the monetary 
policy decisions by constructing an index series, where the deviations of the 
exchange rate and the interest rate from their long run equilibrium values are 
combined. The purpose of computing an MCI is to combine interest rate and 
exchange rate movements in a consistent manner and thus express the change in the 
underlying monetary conditions in a single variable. 
In its original form, as developed by the Bank of Canada, the MCI is, at a 
given time t, the weighted sum of the relative change in the effective exchange rate 
and the absolute change in the short term real rate of interest compared with a base 
period: 
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Where, we is the weight assigned to the changes in exchange rate, wr is the 
weight assigned to the changes in interest rate, ert is the weighted real external value 
at t, er0 is the weighted real external value in base period, rt is the short term real rate 
of interest at t, r0 is the short term real rate of interest in base period.  
The weights we and wr reflect the relative effects of the respective MCI 
component on aggregate demand. In other words, the above weights are proportional 
to the effects of the exchange rate and interest rate on aggregate spending.  
The reason behind the increasing popularity of the use of MCI as an 
operational target across countries such as Canada, Sweden, Norway, New Zealand, 
and by outside monetary policy analysts in Eurosystem is its ability to capture, in a 
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single variable, quantifying information about the stance of the monetary policy 
(Freedman, 1995; Hansson and Lindberg, 1994: Gerlach and Smets, 2000). In an 
open economy, monetary policy influences spending through both the interest rate 
and the exchange rate channel. The overall change in spending therefore depends on 
the changes in these two variables, with the magnitude given by the IS coefficients.  
More specifically, the rise in interest rates or exchange rates causes the 
economy to slow down and thus alleviates inflationary pressures. However, a fall in 
interest rates or exchange rates fuels the economy and leads to higher inflationary 
pressures. Therefore by constructing an MCI, the effects of both the exchange rate 
and the interest rate are taken into consideration.  
4.3 A Theoretical Model on MCI 
Following the discussion on Taylor rule and the MCI, this section will describe a 
theoretical model on MCI. Ball (1999, 2000a) proposes a simple model that captures 
the key interactions of macroeconomic variables and also offers a new policy rule 
that includes MCI. 
The model consists of three equations such that: 
εδβλ +−−=
−−− 111 eryy  (4.3) 
ηγαpipi +−−+=
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)( 2111 eey  (4.4) 
vre += θ  (4.5) 
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Where y is output,  is inflation, r is the real interest rate, e is the real exchange 
rate (a higher e means appreciation) and , , and  are shocks. All variables are 
defined as deviations from equilibrium values and all coefficients are positive. 
Equation (4.3) is an open economy IS curve, where output depends positively 
on its lagged value, and negatively on interest rate and exchange rate. Equation (4.4) 
is an open economy, accelerationist Phillips curve where, change in inflation depends 
on output and the change in the real exchange rate, which affects the inflation 
through import prices. Equation (4.5) posits a positive relation between interest rates 
and exchange rates. In an open economy with capital mobility, higher interest rates 
attract capital, and thus the capital inflow leads to the appreciation of the domestic 
currency. Clearly, the error terms capture the effects of other variables that are not 
defined in this model. 
The central bank chooses the interest rate r. Conducting monetary policy 
affects inflation through two channels. A monetary contraction reduces output and 
thus inflation through the Phillips curve, and it also causes an appreciation that 
reduces inflation directly. The first channel takes two periods to work, whereas the 
second channel takes only one period: After the appreciation of the currency due to 
tightening of the monetary policy, inflation drops in the following period. Therefore, 
due to exchange rate pass-through, there is a direct link between policy and inflation 
rather than the more indirect link between interest rate-exchange rate to output and 
output to inflation.  
After substituting Equation (4.5) into (4.3) and shifting the time subscripts 
one period forward, one can obtain:  
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veyey )/()/( 11 θβλδθβ ++++−= ++  (4.6) 
111 )( +−+ +−−+= ηγαpipi eey  (4.7) 
Assume that a policymaker chooses the current e. Then, one can define the 
state variables of the model by two expressions corresponding to terms on the right-
hand side of Equations (4.6) and (4.7), y+(/)v, and +y+	e
-1.Since the model is 
linear quadratic, the optimal rule in two variables is: 
][])/([ 1−++++= eynvyme γαpiθβλ  (4.8) 
Where, m and n are constants. Plugging Equation (4.5), and rearranging: 
)()1( 1−++=−+ ebayewwr γpi  (4.9) 
Where, w=m/(-m+m), a=(m+n)/(-m+m), b=n/(-m+m). 
Thus the optimal policy rule as a rule for an average of r and e is obtained. Thus, the 
left-hand side variable of the rule is no longer the interest rate like in the standard 
Taylor rule, but the weighted average of interest rate and exchange rate, the MCI. 
Equation (4.9) can be rewritten as 
ewwewbywar ))/)1(())(/()/( 1 −−++= −γpi  (4.10) 
The Equation (4.10) looks more like a Taylor rule. However, according to the 
above equation, the policymakers, in addition to adjusting the interest rate in 
response to changes in inflation and output, also adjust the interest rate in response to 
changes in exchange rates. Equation (4.10) therefore, enables the advocates of Taylor 
rule and advocates of MCI to reach a consensus.  
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4.4 The Key Equations of the Macroeconomic Model 
After a detailed analysis of the theoretical MCI model in the previous section, this 
section describes the key equations of the macroeconomic model developed for 
simulation purposes. The model is given by the following system of equations 
(4.11)-(4.23):4 
IS Curve:  
ttttttt ererirygapygapygap 11432211 )( εαααα +−+++= −−−  (4.11) 
Wage-Price Setting:  
tttttt pclyww 2111111 )( εββ ++−−=∆ −−−−  (4.12) 
Phillips Curve: 
tt
m
ttttt
m
ttt ppclywpE 331211112111 )()( ελλλλλpipi +∆++−+−++= −−−−−+  (4.13) 
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity Condition: 
1++−= tttt eririrfer  (4.14) 
Foreign Sector: 
*
1
*
−
= tt yy ψ  (4.15) 
*
1
*
−
= tt ψpipi  (4.16) 
                                                          
4
  This model is originally developed by ahinbeyolu (2001) and further modifications to the model 
were added by the CCBS/Money and Finance Group. However, some of the equations that were 
constructed for the purposes of the above study were commented out. Additionally, aggregate 
demand, wage-price setting equations were updated. Most crucially, the monetary policy rules in both 
alternatives are the novelties of this study. 
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*
2
*
1
*
tt yi ξpiξ +=  (4.17) 
Production Function: 
tygaplky 4)1( εθθ ++−+=  (4.18) 
144 −= tt δεε  (4.19) 
Monetary Conditions Index: 
rerwwirMCI )1( −−=  (4.20) 
Expectations Formation: 
111 )1( +−+ −+= ttttE piφφpipi  (4.21) 
Monetary Policy Rule: 
Taylor Rule: 
ygapetti t 211 )arg( µpiµpi +−+= +  (4.22) 
MCI Rule: 
ygapettrerwwi t 211 )arg()1)((/1( µpiµpi +−+−+= +  (4.23) 
Where, all variables, except interest rates are expressed in logs. The variable 
y is the output level and ygap is the difference between level of output and potential 
output. k, w and l denote capital stock, nominal wage rate and employment, 
respectively. i and ir are nominal and real domestic interest rates, and irf is the 
foreign real interest rate. The inflation rate and price level are represented by pi and 
pc respectively. pi* is the foreign inflation rate and pm is the price of imports. target is 
the inflation target, and er and rer denote the nominal and real exchange rate, 
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respectively. Et is the mathematical expectations operator as of time t, and ∆ is the 
first difference operator. All the coefficient values are presented in Table C.1 in 
Appendix C.  
Equation (4.11) is the open economy IS equation, where aggregate demand 
depends on the lagged values of the output gap, the real interest rate and the 
exchange rate. The real interest rate is negatively related to the aggregate demand 
since a lower interest rate induces investment spending, and therefore increases the 
aggregate demand. Depreciation of the domestic currency, an increase in real 
exchange rate, fuels the economy since now domestic goods are cheaper than the 
foreign goods, and hence the exchange rate is positively related to the aggregate 
spending.  
Equation (4.12) describes wage-setting of the economy according to which 
the nominal wages depend on the unit labor productivity, past inflation and wages. 
As the labor productivity increases, current wages increase as well. The increase in 
past period’s inflation is also transmitted to current wages through indexation. 
Equation (4.13) is the Phillips curve equation, which describes the price-
setting of the economy. According to the equation, unit labor cost, inflation 
expectations, imported inflation, foreign price level and domestic price level affect 
the current inflation rate. 
Equation (4.14) is the uncovered interest parity condition that links the 
changes in exchange rate to interest rate differential between home and abroad. 
Equations (4.15)-(4.16) describe the inflationary process and the economic growth in 
the foreign sector, which imply that they both grow at the same rate. Equation (4.17) 
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is a standard Taylor rule according to which the foreign sector monetary policy is 
conducted. 
Equations (4.18)-(4.19) describe a Cobb-Douglas type of production function 
where a productivity shock is also included. Equation (4.20) defines the Monetary 
Conditions Index as a weighted sum of real interest rate and real exchange rate.5 
Equation (4.21) gives the expectations formation, which implies that half of the 
agents in the economy are forward-looking and the other half is backward-looking. 
Equation (4.22) is a modification on standard Taylor rule where future 
inflation rate is also added on the right-hand side of the equation.6 Equation (4.23) on 
the other hand, is the alternative policy rule as described by the MCI rule, where the 
interest rate term i in Equation (4.22) is replaced by the MCI term given in Equation 
(4.21). 
4.5 Simulations 
After the previous section where the model dynamics were discussed, this section 
will analyze some simulations on the model. The monetary transmission mechanism 
in Turkey can best be explored by simulating various shocks in the model.7 
Assuming that monetary policy reaction function is described by Taylor rule, three 
basic experiments are conducted. In the first simulation, the impulse response 
                                                          
5
 Even though the MCI is the combination of the weighted averages of the deviations of the real 
exchange rate and the real interest rate from their long run equilibrium values, MCI in the above 
model is the weighted average of the real exchange rate and the real interest rate, since the model 
assumes the long run equilibrium values of the real exchange rate and real interest rate to be equal to 
zero. Furthermore, instead of having a positive weight, real exchange rate has a negative weight since 
in the context of the Turkish economy, a lower level of the real exchange rate corresponds to 
appreciation of the domestic currency. 
6
 When rearranged, one can see that Equation (4.23) corresponds to a policy rule where real interest 
rate is used a policy instrument. 
7
 The model is solved using the Win-solve package and Fair-Taylor solution algorithm. 
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functions to a monetary shock will be analyzed. In the following simulation, the 
impulse response functions to a disinflation will be presented. Finally, in the last 
simulation, the impulse response functions to a productivity shock will be studied. 
Alternatively, same simulations will be repeated, however, assuming that the central 
bank takes into account of the exchange rate deviations in the conduct of monetary 
policy, i.e., the MCI is used as a monetary policy instrument. In all alternative 
scenarios, in addition to analyzing the behavior of the impulse responses, the 
variances will also be examined. All the variables are set to zero in the baseline 
scenario. 
4.5.1 Simulation 1–A Decrease in Nominal Interest Rates 
The first simulation is a temporary and unanticipated one-percentage point increase 
in the annual nominal interest rates. The shock lasts for four quarters. Therefore, 1-% 
increase in the yearly interest rate is proxied by a 0.25-% increase in the nominal 
interest rates on quarterly basis. 
Under both alternatives, with the exception of the initial response of the 
nominal interest rate, the impulse response functions of output, the output gap, 
inflation rate, exchange rate, nominal interest rate and the real exchange rate are very 
similar in terms of their pattern. Yet, there are quite major differences between the 
two rules, such that, if the central bank follows Taylor rule, there is much more 
volatility as evident by the large swings of the impulse response functions of all the 
variables in the question. Furthermore, it takes much longer for the economy to 
stabilize under this rule: Under the Taylor rule, it takes about 33 quarters for the 
economy to stabilize, whereas, assuming MCI rule, this period reduces to 17 
quarters. In addition to this significant difference between two alternatives in terms 
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of the time to stabilization, there is also considerably smaller decline in output and 
output gap under the MCI rule (See Figure C.1 in Appendix C). 
The variances of output, the output gap, inflation and the exchange rate also 
prove the relatively lesser volatility of the economy under the MCI rule. The 
variances of output and the output gap are almost zero under the MCI rule, whereas, 
under Taylor rule, the variances level at about 0.06 after a continuous increase for 17 
quarters. The variance of inflation under MCI rule is about half of the variance of the 
inflation under the Taylor rule, yet, having similar patterns. The variance of the 
exchange rate is considerably lower under MCI rule than in Taylor rule, again 
following a similar pattern. In both alternatives, after following the shock, the 
variances of inflation and the exchange rate reach a higher plateau, but in Taylor rule, 
this level is significantly higher (See Figure C.4 in Appendix C). 
4.5.2 Simulation 2–A Decrease in Inflation Target 
The second simulation is a temporary and unanticipated one-percentage point 
decrease in the annual inflation target. The length of the shock is four quarters. 
Therefore, 1-% decrease in the yearly inflation target is proxied by a 0.25-% decrease 
in the quarterly inflation target. 
Like in the previous simulation, except the initial response of the nominal 
interest rate, the impulse response functions of output, the output gap, inflation rate, 
exchange rate, nominal interest rate and the real exchange rate are very similar in 
terms of their pattern under both alternatives. Major differences continue to exist 
between the two rules in this simulation as well. Assuming that the central bank 
follows Taylor rule, there is much more volatility as apparent by the big waves of the 
impulse response functions of all the variables at issue. However, with the exception 
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of the response of the inflation, the differences between two alternatives in terms of 
the time to stabilization are not so evident this time. In both alternatives, it takes 
about equal amount of time until all the variables in question stabilize. However, 
inflation under the MCI rule shows a quicker stabilization. Like in the previous 
exercise, the impulse responses of output and the output gap exhibit drastic 
differences between two alternative rules (See Figure C.2 in Appendix C). 
Unlike the previous simulation, even though the variances of output, the 
output gap and the exchange rate are considerably lower under MCI rule, the 
variance of the inflation settles at a higher level under the MCI rule. This result is 
surprising given the relatively less wavy pattern of the impulse response function of 
the inflation under the MCI rule. Still, the difference is not so prominent; it 
corresponds to only about 5-percentage point (See Figure C.5 in Appendix C). 
4.5.3 Simulation 3–A Decrease in the Productivity 
The final simulation is a temporary and unanticipated one-percentage point decrease 
in the annual productivity. The shock lasts for four quarters, and like in previous 
simulations, 1-% decrease in the productivity is proxied by a 0.25-% decrease in the 
quarterly productivity. 
Unlike the previous simulations, except the impulse response of output, the 
impulse response functions of the other variables differ remarkably between 
alternative rules. Both in terms of pattern and volatility of the response functions, 
there are noticeable differences between the two alternatives. In the first alternative 
where the central bank follows Taylor rule, there is seemingly greater volatility, 
whereas under the second alternative, all the variables follow a smoother pattern 
towards stabilization. The time to stabilization is significantly different between two 
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alternatives. While, it takes about 10 quarters for inflation to stabilize under the MCI 
rule, it may take up to 33 quarters for the inflation to stabilize under the first 
alternative. However, output behaves quite similarly in both alternatives. Yet, under 
the MCI rule, there is a slightly lesser initial drop in output than under the Taylor rule 
(See Figure C.3 in Appendix C). 
The graphs of the variances of output, the output gap, inflation and interest rate 
have similar shapes under both rules. Like the impulse response function, the 
variance of the output under the two alternatives is nearly the same. The variance of 
the inflation under the MCI rule is almost zero, whereas, it settles at a higher plateau 
under the Taylor rule. The variances of the output gap and the exchange rate are 
higher in Taylor rule than in the MCI rule (See Figure C.6 in Appendix C). 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the choice of monetary regimes with regard to two monetary 
policy indicators: the Taylor interest rate and the Monetary Conditions Index. 
Despite its simplicity and its empirically good performance in some countries like in 
G-7, the Taylor rule has also some shortcomings since it totally ignores the effect of 
monetary policy on the exchange rate, and thus denies the exchange rate pass-
through. However, simply overlooking the link between monetary policy and 
exchange rate only results in missed opportunities on the side of policymakers to 
adjust interest rates in order to offset the effects of exchange rates on spending. This 
ignorance further results in unnecessarily large fluctuations in output and inflation. 
The choice of MCI as an instrument for monetary policy on the other hand, 
enables central banks to respond to the effects of the already operating exchange rate 
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pass-through channel. For a central bank of an open economy with flexible exchange 
rates and capital mobility, it is therefore advisable to include the exchange rate in the 
assessment of the monetary conditions. This applies especially to small economies, 
in which the exchange rate has greater significance for economic development. 
Based on the simulations of the model, the results of this study show the 
unquestionably superiority of the MCI as a monetary policy instrument compared to 
the standard Taylor interest. Under all simulations conducted, the impulse responses 
of output, the output gap, inflation, exchange rate, interest rate, and the real exchange 
rate suggest that the economy stabilizes much more quickly. As evident by the 
volatility of the impulse response functions as well as the variances of the above 
variables, the economy also shows less fluctuation under the MCI rule.  
Given these facts, MCI rule should be preferable over the Taylor rule. 
Moreover, to alleviate the pressures caused by uncertainty in economies like Turkey, 
MCI should also be favored over Taylor interest since it induces less volatility in the 
economy in case of shocks. However, policymakers should also be cautious about 
the choice of the weights of the exchange rate and the interest rate while constructing 
the MCI. Since the theoretically suggested relative weights correspond to the relative 
size of the coefficients of the exchange rate and the interest rate in the IS equation, 
determining the weights depends on the IS estimation. Clearly, there is no single way 
to estimate an IS equation. So, depending on the method used to estimate the IS 
equation, the relative weights may change which can also lead to drastic differences 
in the simulations. Yet, the results of this study remain crucial since it is an initial 
attempt to investigate on efficient monetary policy rules and discuss alternative ones. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation analyzed different aspects of the current macroeconomic 
issues in Turkey. Independent yet interrelated articles on inflation, currency 
substitution and finally optimal monetary policy, which constitute this study, are 
each initial attempt to better understand and deeply analyze the Turkish economy. By 
using various techniques in doing so, these studies have very useful policy 
implications.  
The first study of this dissertation, given the fact that the Turkish economy has 
been experiencing inflation inertia, concludes not only that policymakers should 
consider inflation inertia in conducting monetary policy but also model inflation 
expectations. The empirical evidence as well as the common sense tells that inflation 
inertia should inherently contain a less-than-perfectly rational behavior. The shortcut 
to model this near rational behavior is to assume that expectations are backward 
looking, which, however produces unfavorable results as far as the Lucas critique is 
concerned.  Alternatively, optimal univariate expectations are proposed.  The results 
of the study indicate that optimal univariate expectations can explain the inflationary 
inertia and can also capture a monetary policy change, thus is not subject to Lucas 
critique. 
The second study in this dissertation deals with the problem of persistence, 
however, of not inflation but of currency substitution. Related to the issue of high 
and persistent inflation, Turkish economy has been increasingly faced with the 
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problem of currency substitution. One of the main problems in currency substitution 
is the difficulty in estimating a stable money demand function, which consequently 
implies an ineffective monetary policy. In order to conduct an effective monetary 
policy therefore, currency substitution deserves intense attention. For this reason, this 
study concentrates on the issue of whether or not the currency substitution in Turkey 
has reached an irreversible stage. Using different measures of currency substitution, 
the study confirms that various factors have affected the currency substitution 
process. In other words, the weakening of the Turkish lira and the high inflation, the 
usual suspects, can only be initially blamed for the currency substitution. Indeed, the 
process started to be fed by its own dynamics that signals that currency substitution 
may be inevitable even if a disinflation occurs or Turkish lira strengthens. 
Fortunately, the results indicate that at a larger scale, the economy has not reached to 
this stage that further implies that there is still room for an effective monetary policy. 
Finally, the preceding chapter consists simulations of various shocks under 
alternative sets of monetary policy rules. These exercises are very useful since 
different forms of monetary policy instruments are extensively assessed.  Therefore, 
further line of research should incorporate the results and the implications of the 
studies conducted in this dissertation. Even though, this dissertation broadly covers 
many macroeconomic issues, the scope of this dissertation is still insufficient given 
the complexity of the real world.   
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Figure A.1. The Impulse Response of Inflation to an Unanticipated-Temporary Shock 
to Inflation, Optimal Univariate Expectations, Period 1: 1990-1993. 
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Figure A.2. The Impulse Response of Inflation to an Unanticipated-Temporary Shock 
to Inflation, Optimal Univariate Expectations, Period 2: 1995-1999. 
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Figure A.3. The Impulse Response of Output to an Unanticipated-Temporary Shock 
to Inflation, Optimal Univariate Expectations, Period 1: 1990-1993. 
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Figure A.4. The Impulse Response of Output to an Unanticipated-Temporary Shock 
to Inflation, Optimal Univariate Expectations, Period 2: 1995-1999. 
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Figure A.5. The Impulse Response of Inflation to an Unanticipated-Temporary Shock 
to Inflation, Backward-Looking Expectations, Period 1: 1990-1993. 
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Figure A.6. The Impulse Response of Inflation to an Unanticipated-Temporary Shock 
to Inflation, Backward-Looking Expectations, Period 2: 1995-1999. 
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Figure A.7. The Impulse Response of Output to an Unanticipated-Temporary Shock 
to Inflation, Backward-Looking Expectations, Period 1: 1990-1993. 
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Figure A.8. The Impulse Response of Output to an Unanticipated-Temporary Shock 
to Inflation, Backward-Looking Expectations, Period 2: 1995-1999. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B.1. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients Using CS as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1990-1993 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
dCS1     dCSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
dCS11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.67 -0.85 dCSd1 1.08 2.84 1.04 17.06 
dCS12 -1.16 -1.43 -1.90 -2.28 dCSd2 1.43 2.99 0.55 2.27 
dCS13 -1.34 -1.60 -1.71 -2.85 dCSd3 0.99 1.94 -0.30 -5.44 
dCS14 -0.84 -1.18 0.60 1.59 dCSd4 0.49 1.03 -0.30 -2.04 
dCS15 -0.99 -1.61 0.27 0.82 dCSd5 -1.11 -2.31 -0.33 -8.11 
dCS16 -0.85 -2.01 0.51 1.43 dCSd6 -0.55 -2.34 0.48 7.88 
dCS17 -0.36 -1.61 0.30 0.55 dCSd7 - - -0.05 -0.29 
dCS18 - - 0.01 0.01 dCSd8 - - 0.28 3.42 
dCS19 - - 1.08 1.09 dCSd9 - - 0.88 6.08 
dCS110 - - -1.79 -2.03 dCSd10 - - 0.52 2.18 
dR1 -0.73 -0.68 - - dRd -1.52 -4.08 - - 
dR11 1.20 1.22 - - dRd1 -1.81 -3.43 - - 
dR12 1.48 1.48 - - dRd2 -0.61 -1.20 - - 
dR13 0.90 1.04 - - dRd3 0.16 0.40 - - 
dR14 0.77 0.99 - - dRd4 0.46 1.18 - - 
dR15 2.09 2.94 - - dRd5 0.30 0.99 - - 
dIntDiff1 0.02 1.28 0.03 0.76 dRd6 -0.49 -3.24 - - 
dIntDiff11 -0.01 -0.30 -0.05 -1.43 dRd7 -0.16 -1.14 - - 
dIntDiff12 0.00 0.05 0.03 1.42 dIntDiff1 0.03 9.97 0.02 26.95 
dIntDiff13 0.02 1.89 0.03 1.53 dIntDiff11 0.00 0.30 -0.04 -15.54 
dIntDiff14 -0.01 -0.93 0.02 0.88 dIntDiff12 -0.01 -1.16 -0.03 -3.22 
dIntDiff15 0.01 1.33 0.02 0.88 dIntDiff13 -0.02 -2.65 -0.01 -2.92 
dIntDiff16 -0.01 -1.10 -0.01 -0.51 dIntDiff14 -0.03 -2.95 -0.01 -12.08 
dIntDiff17 - - -0.01 -0.39 dIntDiff15 0.02 2.14 -0.01 -1.31 
dIntDiff18 - - 0.06 1.42 dIntDiff16 - - -0.03 -21.75 
dIntDiff19 - - -0.06 -1.56 dIntDiff17 - - -0.01 -1.21 
dIntDiff110 - - 0.09 2.69 dIntDiff18 - - -0.02 -8.91 
dExch 2.59 0.78 2.92 0.85 dIntDiff19 - - -0.03 -6.26 
dExch1 -9.52 -3.25 -3.72 -0.28 dIntDiff110 - - -0.02 -2.15 
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dExch2 0.85 0.33 6.31 0.58 dExch 1.53 1.57 0.85 3.01 
dExch3 -6.45 -2.56 9.13 0.64 dExch1 -1.55 -1.18 10.21 5.87 
dExch4 - - -4.97 -0.43 dExch2 -0.38 -0.29 14.18 6.99 
dExch5 - - 9.14 0.62 dExch3 -0.97 -0.76 12.71 4.40 
dExch6 - - -13.4 -1.25 dExch4 3.46 3.04 12.66 6.30 
dExch7 - - 11.67 1.03 dExch5 2.69 3.52 11.50 5.37 
dExch8 - - -11.1 -1.33 dExch6 3.39 3.52 11.14 5.58 
dExch9 - - -5.45 -0.93 dExch7 - - 6.73 3.92 
dExch10 - - -11.9 -2.53 dExch8 - - 6.10 7.37 
ecm(-1) -0.33 -0.42 -0.07 -0.17 dExch9 - - 3.03 3.18 
R2 0.86  0.99  dExch10 - - 1.46 4.75 
Adj. R2 0.50  0.56  ecm(-1) -0.65 -1.98 -1.82 -5.11 
F-Stat 2.70 0.03 2.46 0.25 R2 0.96  1.00  
AIC 53.0  84.25  Adj. R2 0.80  1.00  
DW-Stat 1.90  3.76  F-Stat 6.76 0.00 209 0.00 
     
AIC 96.20  182.6  
     
DW-Stat 2.62  3.76  
Table B.2. Estimated Short-Run Coefficients Using CS as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1990-1993 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
dCS1     dCSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
R1 0.62 3.39 - - Rd 0.50 3.55 - - 
IntDiff1 0.00 -0.06 0.02 0.12 IntDiff1 0.02 2.75 0.03 128.63 
Exch 32.4 0.38 62.26 0.11 Exch -0.74 -0.35 -4.70 -15.33 
 
Table B.3. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients Using CS as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 2: 1995-1999 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
dCS1     dCSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
dCS11 2.37 2.27 -5.79 -2.01 dCSd1 -3.11 -1.43 -1.21 -4.03 
dCS12 2.76 2.21 -5.48 -1.96 dCSd2 -0.62 -0.59 -0.46 -1.75 
dCS13 2.95 2.23 -4.91 -1.90 dCSd3 -1.59 -1.03 0.21 0.65 
dCS14 5.26 2.58 -4.52 -1.62 dCSd4 -3.56 -1.55 0.05 0.20 
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dCS15 5.68 2.43 -2.02 -1.60 dCSd5 -0.65 -0.87 0.34 1.32 
dCS16 3.27 1.96 -2.20 -1.99 dCSd6 2.08 1.64 -0.19 -0.97 
dCS17 1.31 1.43 -2.90 -1.91 dCSd7 -1.92 -1.24 0.32 1.33 
dCS18 0.82 1.28 -2.74 -1.71 dCSd8 -3.93 -2.05 -0.86 -7.00 
dCS19 -0.97 -1.99 -2.56 -1.37 dCSd9 -3.56 -0.78 -1.01 -10.50 
dCS110 -0.97 -1.65 -2.19 -1.51 dCSd10 -4.84 -1.17 -0.49 -3.81 
dCS111 - - -2.20 -1.66 dCSd11 - - -0.34 -8.89 
dCS112 - - -2.92 -1.33 dCSd12 - - -0.17 -7.63 
dCS113 - - -0.98 -1.11 dCSd13 - - -0.55 -10.71 
dR1 -2.57 -2.18 - - dRd -17.32 -0.97 - - 
dR11 -7.08 -2.43 - - dRd1 -16.68 -1.09 - - 
dR12 -10.5 -2.60 - - dRd2 0.94 0.14 - - 
dR13 -15.9 -2.72 - - dRd3 -25.78 -0.87 - - 
dR14 -14.5 -2.51 - - dRd4 -40.39 -1.12 - - 
dR15 -6.37 -1.82 - - dRd5 -42.85 -1.01 - - 
dR16 -4.08 -1.79 - - dRd6 -22.78 -0.91 - - 
dR17 -9.10 -2.76 - - dRd7 -25.80 -0.72 - - 
dR18 -4.66 -2.11 - - dRd8 -39.24 -1.13 - - 
dIntDiff1 -0.01 -1.04 0.02 2.09 dRd9 -6.18 -0.42 - - 
dIntDiff11 0.10 2.64 -0.05 -1.20 dRd10 -10.92 -0.45 - - 
dIntDiff12 0.08 2.56 -0.04 -2.41 dIntDiff1 0.01 0.49 0.00 3.92 
dIntDiff13 0.05 2.34 -0.08 -1.63 dIntDiff11 -0.10 -0.86 0.02 34.66 
dIntDiff14 -0.01 -0.58 -0.04 -1.30 dIntDiff12 -0.09 -1.01 0.01 21.45 
dIntDiff15 0.03 2.19 -0.02 -1.29 dIntDiff13 -0.07 -0.72 0.01 13.33 
dIntDiff16 0.03 1.83 -0.02 -0.98 dIntDiff14 -0.02 -0.76 0.02 19.92 
dIntDiff17 0.04 2.83 -0.02 -0.81 dIntDiff15 0.00 -0.18 0.01 15.42 
dIntDiff18 0.03 1.61 0.02 1.15 dIntDiff16 0.01 0.84 0.02 14.93 
dIntDiff19 0.01 1.16 0.01 0.55 dIntDiff17 0.06 1.57 0.01 32.83 
dIntDiff110 0.04 2.16 -0.01 -0.74 dIntDiff18 0.05 1.64 0.02 18.63 
dIntDiff111 - - 0.01 0.52 dIntDiff19 0.06 0.78 0.02 17.22 
dIntDiff112 - - 0.00 -0.26 dIntDiff110 0.03 1.39 0.01 14.15 
dIntDiff113 - - -0.02 -1.20 dIntDiff111 - - 0.01 21.58 
dExch -23.2 -2.47 18.89 2.31 dIntDiff112 - - 0.01 13.96 
dExch1 -85.6 -2.73 -27.20 -1.93 dIntDiff113 - - 0.01 13.23 
dExch2 -64.4 -2.41 -27.54 -1.61 dExch 17.94 0.96 2.95 28.76 
dExch3 -43.4 -2.26 -20.98 -1.21 dExch 1 68.78 1.06 -7.79 -5.29 
dExch4 -49.4 -2.70 -12.79 -1.23 dExch 2 61.70 1.01 -5.90 -4.74 
dExch5 -41.4 -2.56 -26.16 -1.63 dExch 3 50.41 1.02 -5.69 -3.95 
dExch6 -38.4 -2.88 -15.36 -1.96 dExch 4 47.45 1.06 -3.88 -2.71 
dExch7 -31.9 -2.55 -24.71 -1.68 dExch 5 36.32 1.08 -4.91 -3.33 
dExch8 -12.2 -1.75 -15.03 -1.26 dExch 6 29.88 0.91 -3.95 -2.55 
dExch9 -1.91 -0.65 4.65 1.10 dExch 7 16.62 1.02 -5.68 -3.54 
dExch10 - - 4.43 0.85 dExch 8 -3.05 -0.90 -4.19 -3.86 
dExch11 - - 4.07 0.71 dExch 9 -8.30 -1.39 -5.17 -5.13 
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dExch12 - - 2.95 0.42 dExch 10 -4.42 -0.90 -6.57 -6.33 
dExch13 - - -5.31 -1.36 dExch 11 - - -7.40 -8.25 
ecm(-1) -2.60 -2.81 2.55 1.92 dExch 12 - - -6.33 -8.74 
R2 0.96  0.99  dExch 13 - - -2.71 -5.60 
Adj. R2 0.53  0.52  ecm(-1) 7.46 1.25 -0.10 -0.26 
F-Stat 2.39 0.11 2.19 0.29 R2 0.99  1.00  
AIC 84.6  105.87  Adj. R2 0.37  1.00  
DW-Stat 2.64  2.54  F-Stat 1.71 0.32 525.64 0.00 
 
    
AIC 164.22  286.46  
 
    
DW-Stat 3.01  2.76  
 
Table B.4. Estimated Short-Run Coefficients Using CS as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1995-1999 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
dCS1     dCSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
R1 1.61 14.75 - - Rd -0.11 -3.14 - - 
IntDiff1 -0.02 -7.10 -0.03 -3.94 IntDiff1 -0.01 -1.17 0.00 -0.96 
Exch 18.2 6.40 -21.54 -11.84 Exch 5.97 3.04 4.94 2.20 
 
Table B.5. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients Using Re as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1990-1993 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
dCS1     dCSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
dCS11 -0.48 -2.52 -0.67 -0.85 dCSd1 -0.84 -2.43 1.04 17.06 
dCS12 - - -1.90 -2.28 dCSd2 -0.34 -1.19 0.55 2.27 
dCS13 - - -1.71 -2.85 dCSd3 -0.61 -2.69 -0.30 -5.44 
dCS14 - - 0.60 1.59 dCSd4 -0.52 -2.07 -0.30 -2.04 
dCS15 - - 0.27 0.82 dCSd5 -0.23 -0.96 -0.33 -8.11 
dCS16 - - 0.51 1.43 dCSd6 - - 0.48 7.88 
dCS17 - - 0.30 0.55 dCSd7 - - -0.05 -0.29 
dCS18 - - 0.01 0.01 dCSd8 - - 0.28 3.42 
dCS19 - - 1.08 1.09 dCSd9 - - 0.88 6.08 
dCS110 - - -1.79 -2.03 dCSd10 - - 0.52 2.18 
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dRe 0.14 0.16 - - dRe -2.11 -1.65 - - 
dIntDiff1 0.01 1.45 0.03 0.76 dRe1 -2.03 -1.23 - - 
dIntDiff11 0.01 1.6 -0.05 -1.43 dRe2 -3.2 -2.37 - - 
dIntDiff12 - - 0.03 1.42 dRe3 -5.92 -3.74 - - 
dIntDiff13 - - 0.03 1.53 dRe4 -1.92 -1.01 - - 
dIntDiff14 - - 0.02 0.88 dRe5 -1.92 -1.73 - - 
dIntDiff15 - - 0.02 0.88 dRe6 -4.49 -3.78 - - 
dIntDiff16 - - -0.01 -0.51 dRe7 -1.97 -1.37 - - 
dIntDiff17 - - -0.01 -0.39 dIntDiff1 0.03 8.27 0.02 26.95 
dIntDiff18 - - 0.06 1.42 dIntDiff11 0.02 2.07 -0.04 -15.54 
dIntDiff19 - - -0.06 -1.56 dIntDiff12 0.01 1.17 -0.03 -3.22 
dIntDiff110 - - 0.09 2.69 dIntDiff13 0.02 2.74 -0.01 -2.92 
dExch 3.18 2.36 2.92 0.85 dIntDiff14 0.01 1.62 -0.01 -12.08 
dExch1 - - -3.72 -0.28 dIntDiff15 0.01 1.59 -0.01 -1.31 
dExch2 - - 6.31 0.58 dIntDiff16 0 0.37 -0.03 -21.75 
dExch3 - - 9.13 0.64 dIntDiff17 -0.01 -1.48 -0.01 -1.21 
dExch4 - - -4.97 -0.43 dIntDiff18 - - -0.02 -8.91 
dExch5 - - 9.14 0.62 dIntDiff19 - - -0.03 -6.26 
dExch6 - - -13.35 -1.25 dIntDiff110 - - -0.02 -2.15 
dExch7 - - 11.67 1.03 dExch -0.08 -0.08 0.85 3.01 
dExch8 - - -11.13 -1.33 dExch1 - - 10.21 5.87 
dExch9 - - -5.45 -0.93 dExch2 - - 14.18 6.99 
dExch10 - - -11.92 -2.53 dExch3 - - 12.71 4.40 
edm(-1) -0.06 -0.88 -0.07 -0.17 dExch4 - - 12.66 6.30 
R2 0.49  0.99  dEdch5 - - 11.50 5.37 
Adj. R2 0.39  0.56  dExch6 - - 11.14 5.58 
F-Stat 5.98 0 2.46 0.25 dExch7 - - 6.73 3.92 
AIC 47.62  84.25  dExch8 - - 6.10 7.37 
DW-Stat 2.31  3.76  dExch9 - - 3.03 3.18 
     dExch10 - - 1.46 4.75 
     ecm(-1) 0.31 2.13 -1.82 -5.11 
     R2 0.92  1.00  
     Adj. R2 0.76  1.00  
     F-Stat 6.58 0 208.9 0.00 
     AIC 86.1
7 
 182.7  
     DW-Stat 2.03  3.76  
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Table B.6. Estimated Short-Run Coefficients Using Re as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1990-1993 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
CS1     CSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
Re 2.2 0.17 - - Re -4.98 -1.86 - - 
IntDiff1 0.07 1.22 0.02 0.12 IntDiff1 0.02 4.14 0.03 128.63 
Exch 51.11 0.82 62.26 0.11 Exch 3.82 1.89 -4.70 -15.33 
 
Table B.7. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients Using Rinf as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1990-1993 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
dCS1     dCSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
dCS11 -1.18 -2.13 -0.67 -0.85 dCSd1 0.08 0.22 1.04 17.06 
dCS12 -0.25 -0.51 -1.90 -2.28 dCSd2 0.33 1.25 0.55 2.27 
dCS13 -1.60 -2.67 -1.71 -2.85 dCSd3 0.35 1.13 -0.30 -5.44 
dCS14 -0.87 -1.71 0.60 1.59 dCSd4 -0.19 -0.77 -0.30 -2.04 
dCS15 -0.10 -0.24 0.27 0.82 dCSd5 -0.96 -3.25 -0.33 -8.11 
dCS16 -0.16 -0.44 0.51 1.43 dCSd6 0.06 0.17 0.48 7.88 
dCS17 -0.54 -1.90 0.30 0.55 dCSd7 -0.24 -0.86 -0.05 -0.29 
dCS18 - - 0.01 0.01 dCSd8 - - 0.28 3.42 
dCS19 - - 1.08 1.09 dCSd9 - - 0.88 6.08 
dCS110 - - -1.79 -2.03 dCSd10 - - 0.52 2.18 
dRinf 28.4 2.04 - - dRinf -9.34 -2.23 - - 
dRinf1 0.20 0.02 - - dRinf1 -5.52 -1.81 - - 
dRinf2 8.13 0.86 - - dRinf2 0.68 0.21 - - 
dRinf3 26.7 2.55 - - dRinf3 8.00 2.34 - - 
dRinf4 4.12 0.45 - - dRinf4 4.75 1.28 - - 
dRinf5 -10.4 -1.05 - - dRinf5 -0.89 -0.21 - - 
dRinf6 36.2 3.44 - - dRinf6 -5.18 -1.31 - - 
dRinf7 6.22 0.94 - - dIntDiff1 0.03 7.85 0.02 26.95 
dIntDiff1 -0.01 -0.81 0.03 0.76 dIntDiff11 0.00 -0.21 -0.04 -15.54 
dIntDiff11 0.03 1.70 -0.05 -1.43 dIntDiff12 -0.01 -1.63 -0.03 -3.22 
dIntDiff12 -0.01 -1.08 0.03 1.42 dIntDiff13 -0.02 -1.99 -0.01 -2.92 
dIntDiff13 0.02 1.56 0.03 1.53 dIntDiff14 -0.01 -1.48 -0.01 -12.08 
 120
dIntDiff14 0.02 0.91 0.02 0.88 dIntDiff15 0.02 2.22 -0.01 -1.31 
dIntDiff15 0.01 0.61 0.02 0.88 dIntDiff16 -0.01 -1.33 -0.03 -21.75 
dIntDiff16 0.01 0.88 -0.01 -0.51 dIntDiff17 0.01 1.13 -0.01 -1.21 
dIntDiff17 -0.02 -1.28 -0.01 -0.39 dIntDiff18 - - -0.02 -8.91 
dIntDiff18 - - 0.06 1.42 dIntDiff19 - - -0.03 -6.26 
dIntDiff19 - - -0.06 -1.56 dIntDiff110 - - -0.02 -2.15 
dIntDiff110 - - 0.09 2.69 dExch 0.42 0.33 0.85 3.01 
dExch 12.1 3.76 2.92 0.85 dExch1 0.81 0.68 10.21 5.87 
dExch1 -15.4 -2.94 -3.72 -0.28 dExch2 3.22 2.60 14.18 6.99 
dExch2 -11.7 -2.07 6.31 0.58 dExch3 2.12 1.63 12.71 4.40 
dExch3 -3.41 -0.87 9.13 0.64 dExch4 5.34 3.76 12.66 6.30 
dExch4 -9.48 -1.86 -4.97 -0.43 dExch5 3.82 3.80 11.50 5.37 
dExch5 -3.00 -0.90 9.14 0.62 dExch6 4.32 3.26 11.14 5.58 
dExch6 -5.46 -1.56 -13.4 -1.25 dExch7 - - 6.73 3.92 
dExch7 -4.91 -1.67 11.67 1.03 dExch8 - - 6.10 7.37 
dExch8 - - -11.13 -1.33 dExch9 - - 3.03 3.18 
dExch9 - - -5.45 -0.93 dExch10 - - 1.46 4.75 
dExch10 - - -11.92 -2.53 ecm(-1) -0.30 -2.00 -1.82 -5.11 
ecm(-1) -0.28 -0.63 -0.07 -0.17 R2 0.97  1.00  
R2 0.97  0.99  Adj. R2 0.77  1.00  
Adj. R2 0.60  0.56  F-Stat 5.41 0.01 208.98 0.00 
F-Stat 2.85 0.10 2.46 0.25 AIC 96.40  182.65  
AIC 71.7  84.25  DW-Stat 1.97  3.76  
DW-Stat 2.18  3.76       
 
Table B.8. Estimated Short-Run Coefficients Using Rinf as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1990-1993 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
CS1     CSd     
Independen
t Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independen
t Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
Rinf 7.98 1.95 - - Rinf 1.03 0.87 - - 
IntDiff1 0.02 0.85 0.02 0.12 IntDiff1 0.03 2.93 0.03 128.63 
Exch 65.81 0.61 62.26 0.11 Exch -10.4 -1.46 -4.70 -15.33 
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Table B.9. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients Using Re as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1995-1999 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
dCS1     dCSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
dCS11 -1.22 -3.47 -5.79 -2.01 dCSd1 0.04 0.24 -1.21 -4.03 
dCS12 -1.46 -3.63 -5.48 -1.96 dCSd2 -0.22 -1.38 -0.46 -1.75 
dCS13 -1.22 -3.07 -4.91 -1.90 dCSd3 -0.21 -1.32 0.21 0.65 
dCS14 -0.85 -2.33 -4.52 -1.62 dCSd4 -0.32 -1.86 0.05 0.20 
dCS15 -0.61 -2.17 -2.02 -1.60 dCSd5 - - 0.34 1.32 
dCS16 -0.79 -2.9 -2.20 -1.99 dCSd6 - - -0.19 -0.97 
dCS17 -0.31 -1.4 -2.90 -1.91 dCSd7 - - 0.32 1.33 
dCS18 -0.25 -1.43 -2.74 -1.71 dCSd8 - - -0.86 -7.00 
dCS19 - - -2.56 -1.37 dCSd9 - - -1.01 -10.50 
dCS110 - - -2.19 -1.51 dCSd10 - - -0.49 -3.81 
dCS111 - - -2.20 -1.66 dCSd11 - - -0.34 -8.89 
dCS112 - - -2.92 -1.33 dCSd12 - - -0.17 -7.63 
dCS113 - - -0.98 -1.11 dCSd13 - - -0.55 -10.71 
DRe -13.5 -0.33 - - dRe -0.07 -0.5 - - 
dRe1 -7.23 -0.84 - - dIntDiff1 0.01 4.29 0.00 3.92 
dRe2 34.8 3.37 - - dIntDiff11 0 0.35 0.02 34.66 
dRe3 26.7 2.22 - - dIntDiff12 0 -0.28 0.01 21.45 
dRe4 22.6 1.95 - - dIntDiff13 0 2.43 0.01 13.33 
dRe5 8.24 0.8 - - dIntDiff14 0 0.87 0.02 19.92 
dRe6 21.9 2.48 - - dIntDiff15 0 -0.33 0.01 15.42 
dIntDiff1 0.02 3.42 0.02 2.09 dIntDiff16 0 -0.87 0.02 14.93 
dIntDiff11 0 -0.36 -0.05 -1.20 dIntDiff17 0 2.45 0.01 32.83 
dIntDiff12 -0.01 -1.14 -0.04 -2.41 dIntDiff18 - - 0.02 18.63 
dIntDiff13 0 0.25 -0.08 -1.63 dIntDiff19 - - 0.02 17.22 
dIntDiff14 -0.01 -0.73 -0.04 -1.30 dIntDiff110 - - 0.01 14.15 
dIntDiff15 0 0.14 -0.02 -1.29 dIntDiff111 - - 0.01 21.58 
dIntDiff16 -0.01 -1.25 -0.02 -0.98 dIntDiff112 - - 0.01 13.96 
dIntDiff17 0.01 2.44 -0.02 -0.81 dIntDiff113 - - 0.01 13.23 
dIntDiff18 - - 0.02 1.15 dExch 1.47 3.31 2.95 28.76 
dIntDiff19 - - 0.01 0.55 dExch1 -2.17 -3.18 -7.79 -5.29 
dIntDiff110 - - -0.01 -0.74 dExch2 -1.82 -2.55 -5.90 -4.74 
dIntDiff111 - - 0.01 0.52 dExch3 -1.6 -2.57 -5.69 -3.95 
dIntDiff112 - - 0.00 -0.26 dExch4 -0.72 -1.6 -3.88 -2.71 
dIntDiff113 - - -0.02 -1.20 dExch5 - - -4.91 -3.33 
dExch 7.36 3.51 18.89 2.31 dExch6 - - -3.95 -2.55 
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dExch1 -6.96 -2.36 -27.20 -1.93 dExch7 - - -5.68 -3.54 
dExch2 1.77 0.73 -27.54 -1.61 dExch8 - - -4.19 -3.86 
dExch3 1.35 0.55 -20.98 -1.21 dExch9 - - -5.17 -5.13 
dExch4 -0.4 -0.16 -12.79 -1.23 dExch10 - - -6.57 -6.33 
dExch5 2.09 1.05 -26.16 -1.63 dExch11 - - -7.40 -8.25 
dExch6 -1.01 -0.46 -15.36 -1.96 dExch12 - - -6.33 -8.74 
dExch7 -3.74 -2.13 -24.71 -1.68 dExch13 - - -2.71 -5.60 
dExch8 - - -15.03 -1.26 ecm(-1) -0.19 -1.98 -0.10 -0.26 
dExch9 - - 4.65 1.10 R2 0.82  1.00  
dExch10 - - 4.43 0.85 Adj. R2 0.69  1.00  
dExch11 - - 4.07 0.71 F-Stat 7.09 0.00 525.6 0.00 
dExch12 - - 2.95 0.42 AIC 127.4  286.5  
dExch13 - - -5.31 -1.36 DW-Stat 1.94  2.76  
ecm(-1) 0.58 2.79 2.55 1.92      
R2 0.91  0.99       
Adj. R2 0.71  0.52       
F-Stat 4.8 0 2.19 0.29      
AIC 75.2  105.9       
DW-Stat 2.06  2.54       
          
 
Table B.10. Estimated Short-Run Coefficients Using Re as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1995-1999 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
CS1     CSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
Re -0.32 -0.18 - - Re -0.38 -0.5 - - 
IntDiff1 0.00 -0.46 -0.03 -3.94 IntDiff1 -0.01 -1.16 0.00 -0.96 
Exch -20.7 -5.48 -21.54 -11.84 Exch 11.9 2.07 4.94 2.20 
 
Table B.11. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients Using Rinf as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1995-1999 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
dCS1     dCSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
dCS11 -0.41 -1.31 -5.79 -2.01 dCSd1 0.23 0.86 -4.03 -1.21 
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dCS12 -0.56 -1.47 -5.48 -1.96 dCSd2 -0.40 -1.47 -1.75 -0.46 
dCS13 -0.72 -2.26 -4.91 -1.90 dCSd3 0.19 0.69 0.65 0.21 
dCS14 -0.49 -1.55 -4.52 -1.62 dCSd4 -0.72 -2.46 0.20 0.05 
dCS15 -0.52 -1.68 -2.02 -1.60 dCSd5 0.32 1.16 1.32 0.34 
dCS16 -0.75 -2.35 -2.20 -1.99 dCSd6 - - -0.97 -0.19 
dCS17 -0.64 -1.55 -2.90 -1.91 dCSd7 - - 1.33 0.32 
dCS18 -0.77 -1.87 -2.74 -1.71 dCSd8 - - -7.00 -0.86 
dCS19 -0.62 -1.60 -2.56 -1.37 dCSd9 - - -10.50 -1.01 
dCS110 - - -2.19 -1.51 dCSd10 - - -3.81 -0.49 
dCS111 - - -2.20 -1.66 dCSd11 - - -8.89 -0.34 
dCS112 - - -2.92 -1.33 dCSd12 - - -7.63 -0.17 
dCS113 - - -0.98 -1.11 dCSd13 - - -10.71 -0.55 
dRinf -12.8 -0.73 - - dRinf -4.16 -1.13 - - 
dRinf1 -53.7 -2.33 - - dRinf1 -1.70 -0.40 - - 
dRinf2 -60.3 -3.09 - - dRinf2 -4.13 -1.10 - - 
dRinf3 -63.0 -2.75 - - dRinf3 -8.05 -1.96 - - 
dRinf4 -66.5 -2.84 - - dRinf4 -0.61 -0.19 - - 
,dRinf5 -54.6 -2.49 - - dRinf5 -6.34 -2.30 - - 
dRinf6 -20.4 -1.50 - - dRinf6 0.01 0.00 - - 
dIntDiff1 0.01 2.08 0.02 2.09 dRinf7 -5.88 -2.23 - - 
dIntDiff11 0.04 2.69 -0.05 -1.20 dIntDiff1 0.01 3.47 3.92 0.00 
dIntDiff12 0.03 2.63 -0.04 -2.41 dIntDiff11 0.00 -0.09 34.66 0.02 
dIntDiff13 0.04 3.14 -0.08 -1.63 dIntDiff12 0.00 0.84 21.45 0.01 
dIntDiff14 0.03 2.43 -0.04 -1.30 dIntDiff13 0.00 1.45 13.33 0.01 
dIntDiff15 0.04 3.18 -0.02 -1.29 dIntDiff14 0.01 1.52 19.92 0.02 
dIntDiff16 0.03 2.54 -0.02 -0.98 dIntDiff15 0.00 0.45 15.42 0.01 
dIntDiff17 0.04 3.24 -0.02 -0.81 dIntDiff16 0.00 -0.93 14.93 0.02 
dIntDiff18 0.02 2.35 0.02 1.15 dIntDiff17 0.01 2.72 32.83 0.01 
dIntDiff19 0.02 1.69 0.01 0.55 dIntDiff18 - - 18.63 0.02 
dIntDiff110 - - -0.01 -0.74 dIntDiff19 - - 17.22 0.02 
dIntDiff111 - - 0.01 0.52 dIntDiff110 - - 14.15 0.01 
dIntDiff112 - - 0.00 -0.26 dIntDiff111 - - 21.58 0.01 
dIntDiff113 - - -0.02 -1.20 dIntDiff112 - - 13.96 0.01 
dExch 2.91 0.69 18.89 2.31 dIntDiff113 - - 13.23 0.01 
dExch1 -14.3 -2.72 -27.20 -1.93 dExch 2.05 3.22 28.76 2.95 
dExch2 -9.46 -1.88 -27.54 -1.61 dExch1 -2.90 -2.24 -5.29 -7.79 
dExch3 -3.78 -0.93 -20.98 -1.21 dExch2 -2.02 -1.34 -4.74 -5.90 
dExch4 -0.45 -0.12 -12.79 -1.23 dExch3 -2.52 -1.51 -3.95 -5.69 
dExch5 6.44 2.07 -26.16 -1.63 dExch4 -0.88 -0.60 -2.71 -3.88 
dExch6 1.09 0.40 -15.36 -1.96 dExch5 -0.48 -0.33 -3.33 -4.91 
dExch7 0.31 0.10 -24.71 -1.68 dExch6 0.18 0.15 -2.55 -3.95 
dExch8 4.81 1.65 -15.03 -1.26 dExch7 0.60 0.51 -3.54 -5.68 
dExch9 3.21 1.15 4.65 1.10 dExch8 -0.68 -0.82 -3.86 -4.19 
dExch10 - - 4.43 0.85 dExch9 - - -5.13 -5.17 
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dExch11 - - 4.07 0.71 dExch10 - - -6.33 -6.57 
dExch12 - - 2.95 0.42 dExch11 - - -8.25 -7.40 
dExch13 - - -5.31 -1.36 dExch12 - - -8.74 -6.33 
ecm(-1) -0.49 -2.32 2.55 1.92 dExch13 - - -5.60 -2.71 
R2 0.92  0.99  ecm(-1) -0.16 -0.59 -0.26 -0.10 
Adj. R2 0.55  0.52  R2 0.90   1.00 
F-Stat 2.69 0.04 2.19 0.29 Adj. R2 0.68   1.00 
AIC 73.18  105.87  F-Stat 4.54 0.00 0.00 525.64 
DW-Stat 2.24  2.54  AIC 129.1   286.46 
     DW-Stat 2.21   2.76 
 
Table B.12. Estimated Short-Run Coefficients Using Rinf as the Ratchet Variable, 
Period 1: 1995-1999 
Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) Dependent 
Variable 
 (A)  (B) 
CS1     CSd     
Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio Independent 
Variables 
Coef T-ratio Coef T-ratio 
Rinf 21.46 3.55 - - Rinf 1.81 0.44 - - 
IntDiff1 -0.07 -3.34 -0.03 -3.94 IntDiff1 -0.01 -0.47 0.00 -0.96 
Exch 31.78 2.15 -21.54 -11.84 Exch 22.2 0.67 4.94 2.20 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table C.1. Model Parameters 
 IS Curve  
1 1.41 Autoregressive element 
2 -0.66 Autoregressive element 
3 -0.11 Real interest rate response 
4 0.10 Real exchange rate response 
 Wage- Price setting  
1 -0.24 Unit labor productivity 
1 0.09 Import price response 
2 0.11 Unit labor cost response 
3 0.23 Imported inflation response 
 Foreign Sector  
 0.8 Autoregressive element 
1 1.5 Feedback parameter 
2 0.125 Feedback parameter 
 Production Function  
 0.465 Marginal product of capital 
 0.96 Autoregressive element 
 Expectations  
 0.5 Feedback parameter 
 Monetary Policy Rule  
	1 0.5 Feedback parameter 
	2 0.125 Feedback parameter 
w 0.53 Weight of real interest rate 
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Figure C.1. Impulse Responses to a Temporary and Unanticipated 1-% increase in 
Nominal Interest Rate  
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Figure C.2. Impulse Responses to a Temporary and Unanticipated 1-% decrease in 
Inflation Target 
 
 
 
 
  128 
 
Output
Rule 1 Rule 2
-0.9
-0.6
-0.3
0
   1   17   33   49   65   81   97
 
Inflation Rate
 
Rule 1 Rule 2
-0.6
-0.3
0
0.3
0.6
   1   17   33   49   65   81   97
 
Output Gap
Rule 1 Rule 2
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
   1   17   33   49   65   81   97
 
Exchange Rate
Rule 1 Rule 2
-0.6
-0.3
0
0.3
0.6
   1   17   33   49   65   81   97
 
Interest Rate
Rule 1
 
Rule 2
-0.5
0
0.5
1
   1   17   33   49   65   81   97
 
Real Exchange Rate
Rule 1
 
Rule 2
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
   1   17   33   49   65   81   97
 
Figure C.3. Impulse Responses to a Temporary and Unanticipated 1-% decrease in 
Productivity 
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Figure C.4. Variances in Response to a Temporary and Unanticipated 1-% increase in 
Nominal Interest Rate 
 
  130 
Variance of Inflation
Rule 1  Rule 2
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
   1   17   33   49   65   81   97
 
Variance of Output
Rule 1  Rule 2
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
   1   17   33   49   65   81   97
 
Variance of Exchange Rate
Rule 1  Rule 2
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
   1   17   33   49   65   81   97
 
Variance of Output Gap
Rule 1  Rule 2
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
   1   17   33   49   65   81   97
 
Figure C.5. Variances in Response to a Temporary and Unanticipated 1-% decrease 
in Inflation Target 
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Figure C.6. Variances in Response to a Temporary and Unanticipated 1-% decrease 
in Productivity 
 
